

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



## THESIS

EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES ON  
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS: A COMPARATIVE  
CASE STUDY OF EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN  
AND ALGERIA

by

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December 1995

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CASE STUDY OF EGYPT, JORDAN, SYRIA AND ALGERIA

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
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## ABSTRACT

Since taking power in 1952, the Egyptian government has had to face political opposition from the Islamist movement. Egyptian leaders have used various policies to neutralize the Islamists, however, the opposition has become increasingly violent and presents a threat to the stability of the Egyptian government. In the political environment of the Middle East, Egypt has long been a leader among Arab states and an intermediary between them and the West. Therefore, the stability of the Egyptian government is important to the United States in terms of regional peace and influence.

Within the Middle East, there have been other countries that have also encountered political opposition from Islamist movements and have instituted various policies from repression to co-optation in response. The focus of this thesis is on the different governmental responses to Islamic extremism in Syria, Jordan and Algeria, the effects of those responses on their respective Islamist movements, and how those effects compare to the Egyptian situation. Based on these comparisons, the conclusion is drawn that, unless Egypt allows Islamists a voice in government, the regime will collapse.



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In Egypt, violent political opposition from Islamists has become a threat to the regime. Each of the last three Egyptian presidents, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, have used policies of repression and co-optation in efforts to control or eliminate the Islamist movement. These policies have had a direct effect on the growth and development of the Egyptian Islamist movement and have contributed to Egypt's current political climate. While all three presidents had to deal with Islamist opposition, under the present administration of President Mubarak the groups have gained considerable strength and become exceedingly violent. The spread of Islamism as well as the intensity of the opposition have raised doubts to the survivability of the regime. In an effort to destroy this opposition, President Mubarak has resorted to a policy of severe repression. It is difficult to predict whether the Egyptian government will survive and the Islamist movement will be crushed or if the Islamists will become strong enough to overthrow the regime.

Egypt is not the only Arab country to experience opposition from Islamic extremists; the governments in Syria, Jordan and Algeria have also had to deal with similar situations. While each of these countries has had to face serious political opposition from Islamist groups, they have resorted to different policies to deal with the situation.

Syria's response to Islamist opposition is an example of brutal repression that resulted in the virtual elimination of the movement. Jordanian Islamists have been assimilated into normal political discourse through governmental policies of co-optation. Algeria's government did not immediately institute a decisive policy but instead vacillated between concession and repression, resulting in a fierce struggle with the Islamists over the fate of the country.

Egyptian governmental responses to Islamist opposition in the past have had varied results. However, those policies have not been successful in ending the movement, and Islamist opposition has become more powerful in the last decade under President Mubarak than during previous regimes. By analyzing the governmental responses to Islamic extremism in Syria, Jordan and Algeria, one may be able to better understand the forces involved and forecast what may occur as a result from the present Egyptian response. Therefore, the focus of this thesis is on the different governmental responses to Islamism in Syria, Jordan and Algeria, the effects of those responses on their respective Islamist movements, and how those effects compare to the Egyptian situation.

The Syrian model is one which has the most limited value in a sense of duplication or imitation, but does provide an example of the necessary ingredients for a successful policy of repression. Jordan is an example worth

emulating, not only because of its relative success at assimilating the Islamists into the political system, but also the humanity that the government has demonstrated in its dealings with the opposition relative to both Syria and Algeria as well as Egypt. Algeria is not only an example of the failure of governmental policy in dealing with Islamists, but also demonstrates how important it is to have a successful policy. Larger trends found by analyzing the three countries as a group show that the key to the success or failure of government policies towards Islamist political opposition in Arab countries is the loyalty of the military to the leader.

Therefore, in order for Egypt to control the Islamist movement, it must channel them into non-violent opposition through political liberalization. The Muslim Brotherhood must be allowed to have its own political party and provide candidates for elections. The poor economic conditions in Egypt cannot be solved quickly and the situation is only exacerbated by denying the Islamists a voice in government.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Since the Free Officers took power in the revolution in 1952, Islamist groups have been active in political opposition to the Egyptian government. The degree of opposition has varied over the years, from vocal protests to acts of violence against government officials and tourists, including the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Each of the last three presidents since the revolution, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, have used policies of repression and co-optation in efforts to control or eliminate the Islamist movement. These policies have had a direct effect on the growth and development of the Egyptian Islamist movement and have contributed to Egypt's current political climate. While all three presidents had to deal with an Islamist opposition, under the present administration of President Mubarak the groups have gained considerable strength and become exceedingly violent. The spread of Islamism as well as the intensity of the opposition have raised doubts as to the survivability of the regime.

In an effort to destroy this opposition, President Mubarak has resorted to a policy of severe repression. It is difficult to predict whether the Egyptian government will survive and the Islamist movement will be crushed or whether the Islamists will become strong enough to overthrow the regime. However, Egypt is not the only Arab country to

experience opposition from Islamic extremists. The governments in Syria, Jordan and Algeria have also had to deal with similar situations. While each of these countries has had to face serious political opposition from Islamist groups, they have resorted to different policies to deal with the situation. Syria's response to Islamist opposition is an example of brutal repression that resulted in the virtual elimination of the movement. Jordanian Islamists have been assimilated into normal political discourse through governmental policies of co-optation. Algeria's government did not immediately institute a decisive policy but instead vacillated between concession and repression, resulting in a fierce struggle with the Islamists over the fate of the country.

Egyptian governmental responses to Islamist opposition in the past have had varied results. However, those policies have not been successful in ending the movement, and Islamist opposition has become more powerful in the last decade under President Mubarak than during previous regimes. By analyzing the governmental responses to Islamic extremism in Syria, Jordan and Algeria, one may be able to better understand the forces involved and forecast what may occur as a result from the present Egyptian response. Such an analysis would also be helpful in the formulation of a policy that would best serve the interests of the Egyptian government as well as the Egyptian people. Therefore, the focus of this thesis is on the different governmental

responses to Islamism in Syria, Jordan and Algeria, the effects of those responses on their respective Islamist movements, and how those effects compare to the Egyptian situation.

The Islamist movement in Syria began in 1945 with the formation of a Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood became very active in politics, however, the Syrian government banned the organization and adopted a policy of gradually increasing repression. After Hafiz Asad gained power in 1970 through a military coup, the Islamists became increasingly active and violent in an effort to topple what they considered a corrupt government. In 1980, a coalition of opposition groups formed under the banner of Islam called the Islamic Front. This organization proved to be very popular and gained support quickly. It engaged in violent acts such as assassination of public officials and car bombings in its efforts to overthrow the government. Sympathy for the group became so widespread and the acts against the government so frequent that the situation could be called an open rebellion. President Asad quickly acted to eliminate this opposition through brutal methods of repression. In 1982, this policy culminated with the massacre of thousands of people in the city of Hama by 12,000 soldiers sent there to put down an uprising. The repressive policies of Hafiz Asad effectively eradicated the political opposition of the Islamist movement in Syria.

Since his ascension to the throne in 1953, Jordan's King Hussein has also had to deal with Islamist opposition. The Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has a substantial following and is politically active. Instead of a policy of repression, however, King Hussein has adopted a policy of co-optation designed to pacify and contain Islamist activism by assimilating them into the country's political arena. The Brotherhood has been permitted to exist, unlike in Syria and Egypt. Islamic symbols and practices are publicly promoted and observed including religious radio and television programs and mosque construction. The response by Islamists has been very positive and the king's policies have been effective in minimizing the threat to his regime from Islamist opposition.<sup>1</sup>

Algerian Islamism has only recently become prominent in world news. The declining economic situation in Algeria beginning in the late 1970s gave rise to a vocal Islamist movement, particularly among university students. The nature of the opposition grew from demonstrations to violent acts with the aim of dissolving the present government and instituting an Islamic based government. The government used police and the military to crack down on the Islamic extremists; on 6 October 1988 hundreds of people were killed in Algiers and other cities as police brutally put down an

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<sup>1</sup>Peter Gubser, "Jordan: Balancing Pluralism and Authoritarianism", *Ideology and Power in the Middle East*, Peter Chelkowski and Robert Pranger, eds., (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988) p. 97.



uprising with automatic weapons. Shortly afterwards, the Islamists organized themselves into the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a religious party which quickly gained of popular support. Members of FIS became candidates in regional elections and won staggering victories. However, the secular government was unwilling to cede power to the Islamists and the result was a civil war between the military and the Islamists. The political landscape of Algeria became chaos with the final outcome yet to be decided.

In the political environment of the Middle East, Egypt has long been a leader among Arab states and an intermediary between them and the West. The stability of the Egyptian government is important to the United States in terms of regional peace and influence. It is therefore important to have a good understanding of the political situation in Egypt, the nature and strength of the opposition and the government's response to that opposition. It is most important, however, to be able to forecast as much as possible the development of the political environment in the future. Such forecasting makes advanced planning and policy formulation possible for all contingencies. This thesis will use controlled comparison of historical cases in order to: a) analyze the effects of different policies in similar situations, b) apply those effects to the policies instituted in the principal case, c) draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness and outcome of the policies in

the principal case. The cases used for comparison have been chosen because they provide examples of different governmental responses to similar Islamist opposition: Syria with overwhelming repression, Jordan with co-optation, and Algeria with initial inconsistency followed by repression. The results of these different policies have been quite distinct, pointing to a causal effect and, therefore, being potentially applicable to the Egyptian situation.

## II. SYRIA: EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENTAL REPRESSION

### A. APPLICATION TO THE EGYPTIAN CASE

Since Syria's Ba'thist regime came to power in 1963, it has had to contend with political opposition from urban-based Islamist groups, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood. The secular, socialist policies of the Ba'thists are antithetical to the Islamist desire for an Islamic Republic based on the Qu'ran and the Shariah as well as economically detrimental to the middle and upper class merchants (i.e. the commercial elite) from where the Muslim Brotherhood gets most of its members, especially in the Syrian cities. Political opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood has been the largest and most organized threat to the government since the Ba'thists took power, escalating from demonstrations and riots to assassinations and bombings. The opposition culminated in a mass-supported open rebellion from 1976 to 1982, when large segments of the population rallied behind the Brotherhood and participated in uprisings against the government. In response, President Hafiz al-Asad met the rebellion with brutal repression, eliminating the Islamist political opposition and regaining control of the country. The victory of the Ba'thist government over the Islamist movement was due to several situational factors combined with the government's willingness and ability to use overwhelming force to eliminate the insurgents.

The Syrian government's response provides a good example of the effects of policies of repression on domestic Islamist opposition and is, therefore, a relevant case study in a comparative sense for the present situation in Egypt. The level of Islamist opposition experienced in Syria during the late 1970s and early 1980s was far more severe and widespread than Egypt experiences today or has in the past. However, the two cases are still quite similar: both involve the regime's struggle against Islamist opposition groups which advocate the use of violence to overthrow the government in favor of an Islamist Republic. With this in mind, the policies implemented by the Syrian government during the crisis can be regarded as successful in that they ended the rebellion and destroyed the opposition. Therefore, an analysis of the Syrian Islamist rebellion and the government's response may provide the Egyptian government with an answer to their own Islamist problem.

## **B. ISLAMIST OPPOSITION TO THE BA'TH REGIME**

It is important to understand the reasons for the Islamist opposition to the Ba'thist government in order to comprehend the nature of the rebellion and why it gained popular support as well as why the governmental response of repression was successful in putting it down. The source of antipathy of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Ba'th Party is manifold but centers around the Ba'thist secularism. The Brotherhood's *raison d'être* is to establish a government

based on Islamic tenets where religion plays the central role in society. However, the Ba'thist ideology is secular and egalitarian, rejecting the tribal social and political structure.<sup>2</sup> From this basic ideological difference, several corresponding cleavages have formed between the Islamists and the Ba'thists which may be classified as social, sectarian and economic.

### **1. Social Cleavages**

Many of the cleavages begin with the Syrian social structure. Syrian society has historically been very traditional and, over the centuries, this has led to a rigid class structure. The social organization revolved around villages and tribes which each had notable families that presided as the local authority. This class structure was fixed so that it became very difficult for those not born into the notable families to dramatically improve their lot in life or raise their social position in relation to the notables. The Ba'th Party had been formed by middle class intellectuals and lower middle class army officers who were dissatisfied with the efforts of the traditional notables in the fight against French colonialism. The lack of social mobility, however, prevented much action on the part of the non-notable and resulted in rebellion against the class system. As a consequence, the Ba'thist ideology was secular and egalitarian, rejecting the tribal social and political

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<sup>2</sup>Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Bathist Syria*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) pp. 80-119.

structure.<sup>3</sup> When the Ba'thists took power in the early 1960s they began to institute reforms with the intention of abolishing the old class system. Those who profited from the existing social structure tended to sympathize with the Muslim Brethren. On the other hand, those who did enjoy the benefits of the Syrian class system tended to support the Ba'th Party. Many lower and lower middle class Syrians prospered from Ba'thist rule and reform, while many of the high and middle class urban notables and merchants lost much of their income, wealth and status to the same reforms.

## **2. Sectarian Cleavages**

Another cleavage within Syrian society that creates hate and discontent among the Islamists towards the Ba'thists is the sectarian nature of the regime. Syria is a heterogeneous society: the majority are Sunni Muslims but there are significant minority groups of Alawis, Christians, and Druze. The Ba'thist ruling elite gradually became dominated by a minority religious group called Alawis. A heterodox offshoot of Shi'ism, the Alawi religion contains enough differences from mainstream Islam that it is considered by most Muslims to be a heresy. As a result, the Alawis became a repressed group. Discrimination against Alawis kept most of them extremely poor and isolated to the Lattakia region. The Ba'th Party offered this minority a chance to advance within the society and many took advantage of the opportunity, eventually dominating the Ba'thist

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<sup>3</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 80-119.

leadership. The Alawite domination of the Ba'th Party and the Syrian government was completed with the rise of Hafiz al-Asad to the presidency in 1970. Part of the rationale of the Muslim Brotherhood's assassination campaign of the late 1970s was to bring attention to just how entrenched the Alawis were among the country's leaders. The concept of minority rule, especially when the minority consisted of apostates and the rule was secular, enraged many devout Sunnis.

### **3. Economic Cleavages**

The enmity felt by the Islamists towards the Ba'thists was aggravated by Asad's economic policies in the late 1970s. The membership of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood consisted mainly of middle and lower middle class merchants from the cities. The souks were usually in the vicinity of a mosque and, in fact, many of the ulama supplemented their income through small business. Ba'thist policies of industrialization and nationalization put many of these merchants out of work and drastically reduced the income of the rest. Construction and industry brought in large numbers of rural migrants who crowded the cities and took jobs away from the urban middle class. The result was that the traditional membership of the Brotherhood was hit hard in the wallet, further increasing their opposition to the regime.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Alasdair Drysdale, "The Asad Regime and Its Troubles", *Merip Reports* no. 110, pp. 3-11.

## C. THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BRETHERN

### 1. Beginnings

Numerous Islamist groups existed in Syria prior to World War II, mainly concentrated in the northern cities of Homs, Hama and Aleppo. Hama especially, as the center of the old Sunni landed class, was a bastion for conservative minded Syrians. These groups included the Muslim Brotherhood, imported from Egypt via Syrian and Egyptian followers of founder Hasan al-Banna. In 1944, a Muslim cleric, or *alim*, from Homs and graduate of al-Azhar University in Cairo named Mustafa al-Sibai organized many of the small Islamist groups into one organization under the banner of the Brotherhood. Sibai made the organization into a respectable political force, entering candidates in elections and winning many campaigns in the northern cities. The history of the organization prior to 1963 was relatively uneventful save officially being banned from 1952 to 1954 during the dictatorship of Colonel Adib al-Shishakli and from 1958 to 1961 during the union with Egypt. However, with the rise of the Ba'th party to power in 1963, the Brotherhood became heavily involved in Syrian politics, playing the role of opposition party.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Umar F. Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria*, (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983) pp. 88-101.



## 2. History of Opposition

Islamist opposition to the Ba'thist regime began just over a year after the Ba'thist coup in February 1963. In April 1964, a high school student in Hama was arrested for erasing a pro-Ba'th slogan that his teacher had written on the blackboard. When the news of the arrest spread, students began demonstrations and Sunni imams protested from the mosques. When a young demonstrator was killed by police the outrage spread and merchants closed their stores the next day. The call "Islam or the Ba'th" was shouted from loudspeakers in minarets at night. Troops were called in to quell the disturbance and killed several people when they shelled the Mosque of al-Sultan. Blood had been drawn and the Muslim Brotherhood was not about to let the opportunity pass to rally the people against the government. After the shelling of the mosque, resentment and outrage led to nationwide strikes and demonstrations. The reaction was widespread and was not exclusively Islamist, however, the Brotherhood seized the opportunity to organize the demonstrations and strikes, thus seizing the leadership role in active opposition to the regime.<sup>6</sup>

The government moved in and put down the uprising in May. The greatest violence occurred in Hama, where the uprising had begun. Tanks were brought in and used to shell parts of the city controlled by the insurgents. In the end,

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<sup>6</sup>Henry Munson, Jr., *Islam and Revolution in the Middle East*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988) p. 86.

about seventy Muslim Brothers were killed. Arrests of suspected leaders were made and shops were forced to open for business.<sup>7</sup> The significance of the strength of the revolt did not escape the government. Several reforms and concessions were made including a new constitution which declared Islam as the basis for legislation, stipulated that the head of state must be Muslim, and guaranteed more liberal political rights.<sup>8</sup>

The Hama revolt was put down but the underlying opposition did not go away, resurfacing several more times in the 1960s. Between 1965 and 1967, there were two more Muslim Brethren led uprisings, although they were much smaller and less violent than the Hama uprising in 1964. The first of these uprisings, in January 1965, was in response to socialist economic policies such as land reform and nationalization of industry and foreign trade. These policies were not only intended to improve the economy but also to "shift the balance of social power in Syria, to break the hegemony of the upper and upper middle classes over the economy, to snap ties of economic dependency between them and the masses, and to link the masses to the Ba'thi state."<sup>9</sup> Actually, it was the small merchants and

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<sup>7</sup>Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) pp. 92-94.

<sup>8</sup>Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "The Islamic Movement in Syria: Sectarian Conflict and Urban Rebellion in an Authoritarian-Populist Regime", *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*, Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982) p.158 and Derek Hopwood, *Syria 1945-1986: Politics and Society*, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988) p. 99.

<sup>9</sup>Hinnebusch, "The Islamic Movement in Syria.", p. 158.

artisans that felt the most economic pain due to the new policies. This brought about new strikes, demonstrations and protests, however, the base of support was generally contained within the Muslim Brethren. The only other major disturbance during this time occurred in April 1967 when an article by an army officer denouncing religion was printed in an army magazine. The article described religion as a concept that had outlived its usefulness; the modern man must realize that the only one he can count on is himself. In the strikes and demonstrations that followed, Christian clergy and merchants joined the Muslim Brethren until the government cracked down with arrests and forced the souks to reopen.<sup>10</sup>

Between 1968 and 1970 the Muslim Brotherhood experienced an internal division between the moderate leadership of exiled Isam al-Attar and the more militant views of the Brotherhood in the northern cities led by Adnan Sa'd al-Din. The Brethren in the northern cities wanted to begin a "jihad" or holy war against the government while those loyal to Attar, mainly in Damascus, favored less violent approaches. The energies of the Brotherhood were thus spent trying to reconcile their internal differences and not in active opposition to the regime. Ultimately, the Brotherhood divided into two groups in 1971 with the majority following the militant Sa'd al-Din.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 159-160.

<sup>11</sup>Abd-Allah, pp. 107-8.

While the Muslim Brotherhood was undergoing its leadership crisis, Hafiz al-Asad took power in 1970. Asad was more nationalist and less socialist than his predecessor, Salah Jadid, and began to improve relations with the merchant class by counteracting some of the detrimental socialist policies of the 1960s. The honeymoon with the Islamists lasted until 1973, when Asad had his first confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood. The issue was the draft of a new constitution issued in February 1973 which deleted the requirement for the head of state to be Muslim and declared that Islamic law was only a source of legislation, rather than the source. The Brotherhood and the ulama joined forces and demanded that the constitution proclaim Islam the official religion of Syria. Protests, demonstrations, riots and strikes organized and led by the Brotherhood spread from Hama to Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. The government compromised by including the requirement for the head of state to be Muslim but many were not satisfied and it took the government until April to suppress the protests.<sup>12</sup>

After the 1973 war, the Islamist opposition was somewhat pacified by a booming economy. A period of prosperity arose due to several factors which coincided: the oil price explosion of 1973-4 made Syrian income from oil exports rise from \$67 million in 1973 to \$412 million in 1974; an exceptionally good cotton crop increased the

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<sup>12</sup>Munson, pp. 88-9.

profits by \$80 million in one year; and foreign aid from Arab states increased due to Syria's front line role in the conflict with Israel.<sup>13</sup> However, the days of harmony were numbered. By 1976, the Syrian situation had become ripe for rebellion. The economy had lost its momentum with an inflation rate of 30 percent which created an environment for dissension. Two incidents triggered the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood's jihad against the regime and what would become a mass-based rebellion: the involvement of Syrian troops in the war in Lebanon, and the arrest and death of a popular opposition leader.

#### **D. ISLAMIST UPRISING 1976-1982**

Beginning in 1976 the Muslim Brotherhood waged a six-year struggle against the Ba'thist regime in Syria. The group was still divided into two camps - the militants and the moderates - but the majority sided with the militants. The Brotherhood formed its own army, called the Combat Vanguard, which began the jihad with attacks on government officials and buildings. As the violence increased, the opposition gained tacit support from the population, if not active participation. The movement reached its apex in 1980 with mass based uprisings in the northern cities.

##### **1. Catalysts for "Jihad"**

The incidents that provoked the Muslim Brotherhood into action in 1976 are twofold. First, Marwin Hadid, a Muslim

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<sup>13</sup>Drysdale, p. 5.

activist loosely tied with the Brotherhood, was arrested, tortured and died in prison in February. Hadid had been one of the leaders of the 1964 uprising and had spent time in jail in Egypt with Sayyid Qutb, a chief ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and martyr of the Egyptian Islamist movement. Although Hadid's association with the Brotherhood was not a formal one, he had a loyal following which consisted of many members of the Brotherhood and was revered by the militant Brethren for his activism against the government. His death in a government prison, although it was brought about mainly by self starvation, became a rallying cry of the Islamist movement.<sup>14</sup>

The other catalyst for the beginning of jihad was Syrian involvement in the Lebanese civil war. Asad's decision to send 30,000 troops in on the side of the Maronite Christians against the Palestinians was unpopular among the Syrian populace, particularly the Muslims, and discredited the regime's pan-Arab stance. This view was further aggravated when Syrian forces engaged the Palestinian army in the mountains, allowing the Maronite Phalange to massacre several thousand Palestinians in the unprotected Tal al-Zar camp.<sup>15</sup> The perception of betrayal of the Palestinians also confirmed the belief among the Brethren that Asad and his fellow Alawis were not true

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<sup>14</sup>Abd-Allah, pp. 103-7.

<sup>15</sup>Hanna Batatu, "Syria's Muslim Brethren", *Merip Reports* no. 110 (Nov-Dec 1982) p.20.

Muslims. The government was perceived by the Islamists as anti-Islamic.

## 2. Targets

The Muslim Brotherhood's jihad against the Syrian government began with attacks on Alawi leaders, security agents and party professionals with guerrilla hit-and-run tactics and assassinations. The selection of targets made it obvious that the Brotherhood's goals were to make a point of how many Alawis held high ranking positions as well as unite the Sunni majority against the Alawi minority by drawing the government into punishing the community for the acts of the group.<sup>16</sup> The selection of targets increased in scope with time so that by the end of the 1970s the Islamists were attacking government buildings, police stations, Ba'th Party centers and were assassinating Soviet military advisors. Between 1979 and 1981 the Islamists killed over 300 people, mainly Ba'thists and Alawis, in Aleppo alone.<sup>17</sup> In June 1979, the government was brought face to face with the growing power and brazenness of the Islamists when they entered the Aleppo artillery school and massacred 83 cadets, the majority of which were Alawi. The next year the mass-based nature of the uprising became apparent when a general strike was called in Aleppo and spread to other northern cities. Finally, in February 1982

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<sup>16</sup>R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985) p. 115 and Drysdale, p. 8.

<sup>17</sup>Seale, p. 325.

the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama began another uprising which was supported and joined by many who were not associated with the Brotherhood. With the support of the people the Brotherhood seized control of the city for about three weeks. In this final uprising, the people of Hama, led by Muslim Brothers, battled with Syrian army troops in bloody street fighting.

### **3. Popular Support**

What becomes apparent from the narrative of the progression of the rebellion from 1976 until the Hama uprising in 1982 is the growing strength of the Islamist movement and the increasing amount of support from the general population. This can be seen in the scope of government targets growing from hit-and-run attacks on individuals to attacks on police stations and party headquarters to attacks on military schools to actual combat with army troops. By one estimate in Aleppo alone the membership of the Muslim Brotherhood increased from 800 in 1975 to over 5000 by 1978.<sup>18</sup> Another estimate put the total membership of all Islamist groups in the late 1970s at 30,000.<sup>19</sup> There is little dispute that the membership of the Islamist opposition grew during the time that the Muslim Brotherhood was waging its jihad against the government.

There were also those who did not join the Islamists but nonetheless gave passive as well as active support to

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<sup>18</sup>Batatu, p. 20.

<sup>19</sup>Dekmejian, p. 118.



its efforts. Even those who did not agree with the Islamists followed the lead of the Muslim Brethren in political attacks on the government. In 1978 and 1979 the Lawyer's Union issued declarations which demanded the establishment of democracy, an end to human rights abuses by the government and an end to martial law. In 1980 the General Conference of Engineers joined the Lawyers Union in issuing similar declarations for democracy and against political arrests and oppression.<sup>20</sup> Although neither union directly supported the efforts of the Brotherhood, the vocal opposition to the government's treatment of political prisoners and support for freedom of speech provided encouragement and support for the Brethren in an indirect fashion. The support was mainly due to the fact that the Islamists were the only functionally organized opposition group that was actively engaged against an unpopular government. Also, the reaction by the government to the Islamist attacks was not always discriminating and frequently punished groups for the acts of individuals, further alienating the public.

#### **4. Mass-Based Uprisings**

The widespread uprising in 1980 and the battle in Hama in 1982 are two perfect examples of the large amount of public support that the Islamists were given. The uprising in 1980 was instigated by the Muslim Brethren and merchants in Aleppo but they were soon joined by professional

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<sup>20</sup>Abd-Allah, p. 112.

associations such as the lawyers, engineers and doctors unions as well as leftist students from Aleppo University. The uprising was not just contained to Aleppo, either. It spread to the cities of Hama, Homs, Idlib, Latakia, Deir al-Zor, Ma'arrat-al-Nu'man and Jisr al-Shughur. The public support of diverse groups behind the leadership of the Islamists brought images of another Iran-type revolution.<sup>21</sup>

In 1982, when the Islamists attacked government troops and took control of Hama for three weeks, public support was again apparent in the size and nature of the uprising. The uprising started when some Syrian soldiers searching for illegal arms stumbled into a Muslim Brotherhood headquarters and were attacked by those guarding it. When the Brethren succeeded in pushing back the government troops, they continued pressing the attack and expanded to other targets. In a short time, the Muslim Brotherhood had taken control of the city buoyed by popular support. In fact, during the subsequent governmental repression, there were several cases of Syrian soldiers deserting the army and joining the Islamist rebels although not on a large scale.<sup>22</sup> However, while it was significant, the uprising in Hama did not spread to other cities as the one in Aleppo did two years earlier.

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<sup>21</sup>Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Bathist Syria*, p. 294.

<sup>22</sup>Seale, p. 333.

## **E. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE**

The response to the Islamist rebellion by the Asad regime was one of massive and brutal repression. In the initial phases of the jihad the repressive tactics were limited. However, the Aleppo artillery school massacre marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the government to eliminate the Islamist opposition through military means, meeting violence with overwhelming counter-violence. The effects of this policy on the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic uprising were very apparent. The government's campaign frightened away public support from the movement, divided and expelled the Islamist leadership, and eradicated the Islamist forces by turning the Syrian army on its own countrymen. By May 1982 the Islamist rebellion and the Muslim Brotherhood had been obliterated.

### **1. Massive Repression**

When the Muslim Brotherhood's jihad against the Asad regime began in 1976, Asad "seemed slow to react to the internal crisis, as if reluctant to admit that profound fissures existed in his society."<sup>23</sup> The Aleppo artillery school massacre in June 1979 acted as a sort of wake up call to the Syrian government to the strength and reach of the Muslim Brotherhood. The reaction was the arrest of 300 Brethren, of which 15 were executed.<sup>24</sup> However, the Brotherhood continued its attacks on symbols of government

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<sup>23</sup>Seale, p. 326.

<sup>24</sup>Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Bathist Syria*, p. 294.

power such as police stations and party offices and the government became fully dedicated to a campaign of violence in response. During the Seventh Regional Congress from December 1979 to January 1980, Rifat Asad, the president's younger brother who commanded the army's elite Defense Companies, swore he was ready "to fight 'a hundred wars, demolish a million strongholds, and sacrifice a million martyrs'"<sup>25</sup> to stop the Islamic insurgence. The Aleppo uprising in March 1980 truly demonstrated the strength of public support for the Islamists, a very scary prospect for the Ba'thists in light of the recent events in Iran. The response by the Asad regime was to send over 10,000 troops equipped with heavy weapons, tanks and helicopters into Aleppo. The army encircled Aleppo with artillery and opened fire on the city. There were no precise targets; the artillery was used as a means of destruction, to instill fear and soften up the opposition before troops were sent in.<sup>26</sup> The army was expected to be ruthless:

"...The troops were sent in at the beginning of April to seal off whole quarters and carry out house-to-house searches, often preceded by tank fire. Hundreds of suspects were rounded up and carried away. Standing in the turret of his tank, the divisional commander, General Shafiq Fayadh, told the townspeople that he was prepared to kill a thousand men a day to rid the city of the vermin of the Muslim Brothers. His division stayed in

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<sup>25</sup>Seale, p. 327.

<sup>26</sup>Interview with LtCol. Terry Johnson, USA(Ret.) Col. Johnson, a retired army intelligence officer, was stationed in Syria in 1980 and reported on the siege at Aleppo from the scene.

Aleppo for a whole year, with a tank in almost every street."<sup>27</sup>

In all, about 25,000 troops were used to put down the uprising that had spread throughout the northern cities and hundreds of insurrectionists were killed.<sup>28</sup>

The Muslim Brotherhood was not through, however, and made an assassination attempt on President Asad on 26 June 1980 which he barely escaped with his life. In response, early the next morning Rifat moved his Defense Companies into a prison in Palmyra that was full of Muslim Brethren. The soldiers were given orders to kill all the prisoners. About 500 inmates died in the massacre.<sup>29</sup>

On 8 July 1980, in further response to the assassination attempt, Asad made membership in the Muslim Brotherhood a crime, punishable by death. This had a dramatic effect on the strength of the Islamists, as over a thousand Brethren took advantage of a 50 day amnesty period to renounce their membership. This blow seriously weakened the Brotherhood and was a factor in the decision to form the Islamic Front later that year.<sup>30</sup>

Other tactics were used by the government to instill fear in the hearts of the Islamists and eliminate the opposition. In late July 1980 the Syrian army attacked a Muslim Brotherhood training camp in Jordan. In August

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<sup>27</sup>Seale, pp. 327-8.

<sup>28</sup>Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Bathist Syria*, p. 295 and Drysdale, p. 8.

<sup>29</sup>Seale, p. 329.

<sup>30</sup>Munson, p. 92.

dozens of males over the age of fourteen suspected of belonging to the Brotherhood were rounded up and executed. In March 1981 Syrian assassins trying to kill exiled Muslim Brotherhood leader Isam al-Attar murdered his wife instead.<sup>31</sup>

In February 1982 the regime's response to the uprising in Hama signaled the climax of the campaign against the Islamists and the end of the Islamist militant opposition. As in Aleppo two years earlier, Syrian troops were called in and armed with heavy weapons, tanks and helicopters. The insurgents did not give in without a fight, though, and controlled the city, or parts of it, for three weeks. The Syrian army was given the authority to use all force necessary to completely eliminate the Islamist opposition. Tanks were used to level whole neighborhoods, families were taken from their homes and shot, and many innocent people were buried alive in the rubble. The battle for Hama turned into a bloodbath, wiping out the militant Islamists, their supporters and many innocent bystanders. The total number of casualties will never be known but it is conservatively estimated that between 5000 and 10,000 people<sup>32</sup>, and possibly as high as 30,000, were killed in the assault.<sup>33</sup> The destruction of the city and the slaughter of those within left little doubt in the minds of the opposition left

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<sup>31</sup>Seale, p. 329.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 333-4.

<sup>33</sup>Moshe Ma'oz, "The Emergence of Modern Syria", *Syria Under Asad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986) p. 32.

in the country that the government would and could do anything to stop the insurgents and remain in power.

## **2. Effects of Governmental Response**

The repressive policies of the government paid big dividends. The results of the governmental repression became apparent when, in October 1980, the announcement was made of the formation of a new group called the Islamic Front. The loss of members due to Law 49, which made membership in the Muslim Brotherhood a capital offense, was coupled with the loss of popular support to seriously weaken the Brotherhood. "As the only organization with the discipline, training and experience to undertake military activity, the Brotherhood had over the years won the tacit support of most other opposition groups in Syria. But as government reprisals became harsher and less discriminating, and especially in the wake of Hama this support began to melt away."<sup>34</sup> The composition of the Islamic Front consisted of the weakened Muslim Brotherhood joined by other Islamist groups as well as groups that were not necessarily Islamist but did not object to the concept of an Islamic government. The group produced a proclamation which detailed the type of government that it planned on bringing about through revolution. The political structure described in the proclamation was a democratic Islamic government that protected the basic freedoms of speech, assembly and

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<sup>34</sup>Judith Perera, "The Shifting Fortunes of Syria's Muslim Brothers", *The Middle East* May 1993, p. 25.

religion. It was an obvious attempt to regain lagging support for the opposition movement from secular groups. After the violent end of the Hama revolt the Muslim Brotherhood again tried to gain support by organizing a broad based opposition group. By this time, however, the Brotherhood was so weakened by the government's repressive policies that it was forced to ally itself with very secular groups under the protection of Iraq, another Ba'thist regime. The new group was called the National Alliance for Liberation of Syria and was basically a tool of the Iraqi government. In any case, it has proven to be impotent since Syria has not experienced any more revolts since Hama.

The military victory over the Islamists also created large rifts in the Muslim Brotherhood. The members became unable to decide on a leader and the group divided into two factions, one based in Iraq and the other in Saudi Arabia.

The military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood was also wiped out. What little organization there was left after Hama was decapitated when its leader, Adnan Uqla, was lured back to Syria by a double agent and disappeared.<sup>35</sup>

## **F. CONCLUSION**

The Islamist rebellion in Syria in the late 1970's and early 1980's had the potential to bring down the Asad regime and, some say, came close to doing so. The failure of the

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<sup>35</sup>Chris Kutschera, "When the Brothers Fall Out", *The Middle East* April 1988, p. 21.



Syrian government to check the Islamist opposition at the beginning of its campaign of violence enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to gain a large membership as well as tacit support from a large section of the populace. The Islamists were successful in drawing attention to the Alawi dominance in government and forcing the government to engage in collective punishment in response to Islamist attacks, which helped the Brotherhood gain support. The attacks by the Islamists proved that the regime was vulnerable: Asad was very nearly assassinated and many other officials were not so lucky, including the 83 cadets at the artillery school. The dedication and leadership of the Brotherhood combined with the general discontent with the regime resulted in the mass based uprisings in Aleppo in 1980 and Hama in 1982, nearly engulfing the country in revolution.

There are several reasons that the Islamists failed in their attempt at overthrowing the government. The Muslim Brotherhood suffered from the lack of a single charismatic leader, such as Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Without such a leader, the Islamists became divided by internal squabbles and factionalism. A contributing factor to their impotence is the fact that Asad forced them out of the country and they are now an expatriate organization. Also, during the entire struggle between the Islamists and the regime, Asad retained the loyalty of the Syrian troops. Other than some isolated desertions during the Hama uprising, the Syrian

army carried out its orders in attacks against fellow Syrians.

The main reason why Asad was able to overcome the Islamist opposition in Syria was the complete devotion, unequivocal and single minded, to the brutal and violent elimination of the group by any and all means necessary. The Asad regime was able to break the back of the opposition through the uncompromising use of force and violence. The numerous examples of police tactics against members of the Brotherhood such as large scale arrests, imprisonment and executions were used without hesitation but were not successful in ending the opposition. The uprisings in Aleppo and Hama, particularly the latter, provided the government with the opportunity to eliminate the Islamic insurgence. The brutal and bloody razing of Hama wiped out the last stronghold of the Islamists and served as a signal to the rest of the country that violent opposition to the government is a deadly mistake. After 1982 the Muslim Brotherhood ceased to exist in Syria and the rest of the population was frightened and bullied into submission. Since the devastation in Hama, there has not been another attempt at rebellion due to the fear generated by the extreme measures that were taken against the Muslim Brotherhood. Certainly it was able to do these things because Syria is governed by an autocratic, even fascist, regime. It does not have a liberal democracy and Asad has the ability to use extreme measures to maintain rule and

ensure peace and order. Although the Syrian army has not had great success in its battles with the Israelis, it has been quite adequate for dealing with internal conflicts. Without liberal ideas like human rights and democracy to hold him back, Asad simply beat the offending animal with his biggest stick until it stopped moving.



### III. JORDAN: ASSIMILATION THROUGH CO-OPTATION

#### A. APPLICATION TO THE EGYPTIAN CASE

Islamist opposition in Jordan has existed for half a century but has not been marked by the violence that it has brought to Egypt. The Islamist movement in Jordan can be characterized as a "loyal opposition" mainly due to the government's policy of co-optation. Since he ascended to the throne in 1952, King Hussein has actively supported the Muslim Brotherhood by giving it a legal status and freedom to organize and conduct business. In return, the Brethren have given support to the regime and have refrained from violence and plots against the government. Instead, they have confined their disagreements with the regime to political discourse in the form of demonstrations and parliamentary debate. As a result of the government's hands-off policy, the Muslim Brotherhood is the largest and most visible Islamist organization in Jordan, eclipsing the Islamic Liberation Party, an offshoot of the Brotherhood which advocates the violent overthrow of the monarchy. Islamists used the Brotherhood as a pseudo-political party for many years when parties were illegal under martial law to voice their opposition to the government on individual matters. The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood remains antithetical to the nature of the regime, however, and must still be considered a political opposition group. Certainly, the relationship between the regime and the

Islamists has not been without its problems, it has waxed and waned over the years. A major change in the relationship occurred in 1989 when parliamentary elections were held for the first time in 20 years.<sup>36</sup> Candidates from the Muslim Brethren swept the elections and formed the largest bloc in parliament. The king used legal techniques to retain what is essentially absolute political power and the Islamists proved they were willing to work within a democratic environment that gave them a voice in government.

The Jordanian government's policies towards Islamist opposition demonstrate the possibilities of reducing violent opposition through the enfranchisement of Islamist groups. The level of cooperation between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood and the confinement of Islamist groups to their role as a loyal opposition make the Jordanian model a relevant case study to compare with Egyptian situation. The Jordanian government is quite different from that in Egypt and King Hussein has the advantage of having a certain amount of Islamic credibility that President Mubarak lacks. However, the Islamist opposition does exist within Jordan

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<sup>36</sup>The last national elections held prior to 1989 were in 1967. In 1971, King Hussein postponed the regular elections citing the Israeli occupation of the West Bank as an obstacle that must first be overcome before elections could again be held. Then, in 1974, the Arab heads of state issued a joint decision that the PLO was the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In response, King Hussein dissolved the Parliament and indefinitely suspended elections. Parliament was replaced by a National Consultative Council (NCC) which could not make policy nor approve, amend or reject any bill. Their function was simply to study, debate and give advice on bills proposed by the Council of Ministers. In 1984, King Hussein recalled the House of Representatives that had been dismissed ten years earlier. *Jordan: A Country Study* (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1991) pp. 189-90.

and King Hussein's heritage certainly does not entirely account for the lack of violent opposition from Jordanian Islamists. There is undoubtedly enough similarity between Jordan and Egypt for the Jordanian case to provide some lessons for the Egyptian Islamist problem. The Jordanian case provides an excellent example of successful co-optation of the opposition through inclusion. The Islamists have refrained from violence and have actually become involved in the political process, thus associating themselves with the government. By allowing the opposition to express their views in a political forum without the threat of repression, the regime in Jordan has effectively assimilated the Islamists into the political structure. An analysis of Jordanian policies, therefore, may provide answers to the Egyptian Islamist dilemma.

## **B. ISLAMIST OPPOSITION IN JORDAN**

Before discussing the current situation in Jordan, one must first have a basic understanding of the history and nature of Jordanian Islamism. Islam has historically had a very strong following in Jordan, which has provided Islamists with a natural constituency and large recruiting pool. Jordan (or Transjordan, as it was called prior to 1967) is a traditionally conservative Muslim country which is much more religiously homogeneous than Syria or Egypt. Over 90 percent of Jordanians are Sunni Muslims, while only 5-8 percent are Christian and the remainder of the

population is made up of a tiny number of Shi'a Muslims and assorted other religions. The king, Hussein ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Hussein al-Hashimi, is a practicing Muslim and claims descent from the Prophet, further cementing the Jordanian connection with Islam.

### **1. Muslim Brotherhood**

Political Islamism made its appearance in Jordan in the mid-1940s when the Muslim Brotherhood opened branches in several Jordanian towns and cities. The movement remained relatively nascent until the 1948 war with Israel when the Brotherhood's ranks grew exponentially with Muslims opposed to the creation of the Zionist state. The Brotherhood also received a certain amount of popularity due to the fact that the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, was a member of the Jerusalem branch.<sup>37</sup>

The first general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was Abd al-Latif Abu Qura who held extremely anti-Western views and, as a result, was closely watched by authorities. He was replaced as general guide in 1953 by Abd al-Rahman Khalifa. It was in 1953 that the Muslim Brotherhood applied for and was granted status as a legal organization from the Jordanian government. Khalifa was the undisputed leader of the Brotherhood from 1954 until about 1963 and was primarily responsible for the organization and spread of the movement in Jordan. He organized the group's

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<sup>37</sup>Zaid Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994) p.3.



activities on a national level and increased coordination and cooperation between the various local branches. It was under Khalifa's leadership that the Brotherhood first began to organize sporting events, put on plays, and set up political speeches and discussions. The Brotherhood also created a youth scout organization which included instruction in the use of weapons. The latter activity was a cause of concern for the authorities. Although Khalifa never achieved the status of Hassan al-Banna, he was the most important figure during the first fifteen years of the Brotherhood's existence in Jordan. He is considered the founding father of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and left a personal mark on the movement. In 1963, when Yusuf al-Azm assumed the leadership role of the Brotherhood, Khalifa retained the honorary title of General Guide.

While the loss by the Arab armies to the Israelis in the June 1967 War gave momentum to the Islamist movements in many Middle East countries, in Jordan it marked the rise of Palestinian nationalism. The Jordanian Islamists did not enjoy the same rise in popularity and increase in participation that their counterparts did in Egypt. Instead, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) became a leader in the fight to regain Palestine from the Israelis and gained much support in Jordan where thousands of Palestinian refugees had fled from the West Bank. However, by the late 1970s, people were becoming disillusioned with Palestinian nationalism, pan-Arabism and

Marxism because they had all failed to solve the Palestinian problem. As a result, Islamism began to gain support in Jordan. The Muslim Brotherhood had positioned itself to take advantage of the shift in public sentiment. In the late 1960s, it had begun to involve itself in activities such as Islamic charity associations, managing nursery schools and kindergartens, supervising religious schools, and establishing neighborhood sports clubs and libraries, all in an effort to spread its influence. In the mid-1970s, after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Jordanian Brotherhood combined with the Brotherhoods in those territories to form the Muslim Brotherhood Society in Jordan and Palestine. The Brotherhoods in the West Bank and Gaza Strip receive guidance from the leadership in Jordan but each retain a certain amount of autonomy necessary to deal with their own particular situations.<sup>38</sup> In 1980, the Muslim Brotherhood set up paramilitary camps in Jordan near the Syrian border for members of the Syrian Brotherhood who were attempting to bring down the regime of Syrian president Hafez al-Asad. King Hussein supported the Brotherhood in this endeavor which drew the ire of Asad. However, in 1985, when relations between Syria and Jordan warmed somewhat, King Hussein denounced the Brotherhood's involvement and jailed many known members.<sup>39</sup> The year 1989 proved to be the

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<sup>38</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>39</sup>Beverly Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan", *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf*

turning point in the relationship between the king and the Islamists when he ordered parliamentary elections to be held, which gave the Brotherhood a large voice in the government.

Although the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has received a certain amount of freedom, even support, from the monarchy and, in turn, has supported the regime during crises, it is still considered an Islamist opposition group. The Muslim Brotherhood is ideologically opposed to the Jordanian constitution, which is modeled on that of France. The Brotherhood believes that by relying on a form of government imported from the West, the regime separates the Jordanian people from their Islamic heritage. Instead of being governed and judged by God's law the people are forced to use the laws of the infidel.<sup>40</sup> However, the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood also focuses on the reform of the individual before the reform of society. Once people have been freed from corruption, fear, ignorance and materialism, then social reform can be accomplished. The Brotherhood believes this Islamic reawakening can be accomplished peacefully, without the use of violence or revolution.<sup>41</sup>

Although the Brotherhood renounced violence as a means of social change, it has still opposed the regime on many

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*Crisis*, James Piscatori, ed., (The Fundamentalism Project: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991) pp. 90-1.

<sup>40</sup>Amnon Cohen, *Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-1967*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982) p. 180.

<sup>41</sup>Emile Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics Since 1967*, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1988) p. 145

policies. There are several examples of political opposition to the regime by the Brotherhood since their formation. In fact, the Brotherhood has played an active role in Jordanian politics since the 1950s, frequently taking a position counter to the monarchy. The first two general guides, Qura and Khalifa, were arrested several times for speaking out against the government and, at one point in 1955, Khalifa was forced to flee to Damascus to avoid arrest. Each time either was arrested they were released shortly afterward. The first instance of major opposition to the regime was in 1954 when demonstrations and a general strike were organized by the Muslim Brotherhood against the use of British officers in the Jordanian army. In fact, the leader of the army since 1930 was John Bagot Glubb, also known as Glubb Pasha, a British army officer. Any hint of Western influence was reason for the Brotherhood to rally against the regime. Another large demonstration against the government occurred in 1956 when King Hussein announced his intention to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. The announcement was met with outrage by the Islamists as well as by many secularists because it was sponsored by Britain and was therefore regarded as forfeiting Jordan's sovereignty to England. Hussein bowed to public pressure and backed out of signing the Pact. Later that year he also dismissed the British officers from the Jordanian army, including Glubb Pasha, an act which was perceived as throwing off the yoke of British imperialism

once and for all. In 1958, the Brotherhood launched a political attack on the regime when Jordan became more closely tied to the United States, partially as a result of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The government responded by again arresting the general guide, a move that prompted mass demonstrations in the city of Nablus on the West Bank. The regime placed the organization under tight surveillance but took no further overt action.<sup>42</sup> That same year, the Brotherhood publically opposed the Jordanian request for British military assistance during the crisis after the Iraqi revolution. Again, the opposition was non-violent and was not repressed by the government.<sup>43</sup>

After 1958, most of the Brotherhood's opposition to the regime revolved around domestic policy. In 1960 they protested against the government's decision to allow an ice ballet company to perform in the country. It was seen as an example of the government's indifference to moral standards. As a result, several members of the movement including the general guide were arrested that year.<sup>44</sup> Other demands made upon the government by the Muslim Brotherhood included the forbidding of government officials to drink wine in public, barring of women to hold government office, and banning of any form of entertainment perceived as immoral. In 1965 several members of the Brotherhood were arrested for

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<sup>42</sup>Cohen, p. 150.

<sup>43</sup>Lawrence Tal, "Dealing with Radical Islam: The Case of Jordan", *Survival* vol. 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995) p. 141.

<sup>44</sup>Cohen, p. 151.

planning to demonstrate outside cinemas and other places of entertainment that provided immoral fare. Much of the opposition to the government occurred in Parliament where the Islamists had several elected representatives. In 1961 the Islamist representatives opposed the budget for the Jordanian broadcasting services due to the belief that they played immoral songs and music. In 1963, three Islamist representatives gave a vote of nonconfidence in the king's cabinet for failing to apply the shariah to Jordanian law and enforce Islamic moral values, failing to keep Jordan out of the Western sphere of influence and failing to persevere in the jihad against Israel.<sup>45</sup>

## **2. Islamic Liberation Party**

The non-violent nature of the Muslim Brotherhood's activities and the willingness to work with the government gave them the label of "loyal opposition." In 1952, a group which was more violently opposed to the regime and believed that the Brotherhood was no longer faithful to the tenets of Islam broke away and formed their own Islamist organization called the Islamic Liberation Party. The new group was formed and led by Taqi al-Din Nabhani, a former Muslim Brother who advocated the overthrow of the Hashemite regime and the establishment of a Caliphate in its place.<sup>46</sup> The ideology of the group is totally pan-Islamic, they oppose a separate Palestinian state and advocate the reform of

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<sup>45</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 151-184.

<sup>46</sup>Tal, p. 153 (endnote no. 3).

society to a proper Islamic way of life according to the Qu'ran and the shariah through intellectual and political revolution.

The Islamic Liberation Party has never achieved the status or size of the Muslim Brotherhood. Restrictions by the government, the popularity of the Brotherhood among Islamists, infiltration by Jordanian intelligence and the setbacks during the first decade of the group's existence, are all obstacles that the organization has never really overcome.<sup>47</sup> The group applied for permission to establish a political party in the same manner as the Brotherhood but was turned down. The reason for the disapproval of the application was because the proposed party's platform called for an elected leader, embraced Islam as the basis of the state and, therefore, was contrary to the Jordanian constitution. Undaunted, the group publicly declared its intention to form an association by taking advantage of the Ottoman laws still in effect in the West Bank which allowed associations to be formed without permission from the government. The regime responded by arresting the members of the group.<sup>48</sup> In fact, the government was well aware of the group's beliefs and considered it a threat to the regime. As a result, tactics such as arrest, expulsions and legal restrictions were used to hinder the group's activities and growth.

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<sup>47</sup>*Ibid*, p. 140.

<sup>48</sup>Cohen, pp. 209-10.

Organization efforts were slow; not many Islamists were willing to leave the Muslim Brotherhood which had legal status and a larger membership to join the new group, which was outlawed. To make matters worse, the organization was further weakened by internal dissension. Although Nabhani was the undisputed leader, he was forced to leave the country and had to issue orders from Damascus and Beirut which weakened his ability to organize and lead. The group tried to expand and work towards its goal of overthrowing the regime by preaching its message at the mosques and teaching its message in the schools, particularly in the West Bank. "Not only did preaching provide the party with a regular, broadly based audience; it also made the party's influence appear to extend well beyond its actual membership, and authorities viewed this apparent influence with concern...As self confidence increased, the party began to ignore repeated warnings issued by the authorities, and even began to incite the congregation against the regime."<sup>49</sup> As a result, the government made it illegal to preach or teach at a mosque without prior permission. Also, many members of the organization were schoolteachers and used their positions to recruit students. The government again clamped down on the group and banned the use of political materials in the classroom.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup>*Ibid*, pp.214-5.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid*, p. 217.



The group was severely hampered by these restrictions and its influence waned. The group found itself restricted to distributing leaflets and holding study groups comprised of 5-10 members in private homes. The study groups were forums for the dissemination of party doctrine as well as Islamic teaching. The leadership of the party resorted to a gradualist approach, i.e. slowly build up support and strength of the party instead of looking for a quick solution. It also attempted to achieve its goals by working within the framework of the constitution and putting its own candidates up for election. The party put up candidates for the 1954 and 1956 elections but only one was elected each time, Ahmad al-Daur, who ran with the added support of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was later expelled from the House of Representatives and put in prison for two years for subversion. The Islamic Liberation Party refrained from contesting any further elections.<sup>51</sup> Since their formation the Islamic Liberation Party has had little impact on Jordanian politics.

The relationship between the two Islamist groups was antagonistic although there were early discussions of unification. The Islamic Liberation Party envied the legal status that the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed and used to its advantage. Talks of unification were pointless, however, because basic ideological differences could not be overcome. The Islamic Liberation Party attacked the Muslim Brotherhood

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<sup>51</sup>*Ibid*, p. 216.

for its contacts with the government, calling the Brethren collaborators with an illegal monarchy.<sup>52</sup> The Brethren responded by saying that the Islamic Liberation Party did not represent true Islam. All in all, the Muslim Brethren were not threatened by the upstart party. Their legal status gave them a major advantage over the Islamic Liberation Party and the attacks on their loyalty did not do much harm to their credibility.

### **C. CO-OPTATION OF THE ISLAMISTS**

The Jordanian monarchy's co-optation of the Islamic opposition involved a *quid pro quo* arrangement: the regime extended a legal status to the Muslim Brotherhood and allowed it to function as a political party while the Muslim Brotherhood allowed itself to be co-opted by remaining loyal to the regime while opposing specific policies and supporting the regime when it was necessary. As a result, both sides benefited from the relationship in many ways, including the marginalization of common enemies such as communists and providing mutual legitimacy by each recognizing and cooperating with the other.

#### **1. Methods of Co-optation**

The main tool that the regime used for co-opting the Islamists was the legalization of the Muslim Brotherhood.

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<sup>52</sup>Glenn E. Robinson, "The Islamist Movement in Jordan Under Liberalization", *Different Aspects of Islamic Fundamentalism: Theoretical Issues and Case Studies*, Ahmad Moussalli, ed., (University of Florida Press, forthcoming) p. 10.

The government gave the Islamists a stake in the system by giving the Islamists a voice to express their disagreement and a forum to oppose government policy without resorting to violence. The freedom to organize and function as legal party gave the Muslim Brotherhood a special status because, although it was technically a religious and social organization, it did involve itself in politics. The Brotherhood, therefore, had the distinction and advantage of being the only legal political party after political parties were banned in 1957, and made illegal in 1967. The Brotherhood responded positively to this by engaging in activities that were not detrimental to the regime; they opposed specific policies but supported the regime overall. An example is the support they gave Hussein in 1957 during a coup attempt by Hussein's prime minister and elements of the army. The Brotherhood rallied behind Hussein despite their political differences including a major one over the Baghdad Pact the previous year.

## **2. Willingness to be Co-opted**

The special status accorded them by the regime and the accompanying voice it gave them in government were not the only reasons that the Muslim Brotherhood supported the regime. Another reason for their willingness to be co-opted was that the Islamic nature of the regime itself enabled them to rationalize and defend their relationship with the government. King Hussein is a practicing Muslim and is very public about his faith, often being seen on Jordanian

television praying at a local mosque. More importantly, King Hussein is a member of the Hashemite family which traces its descent direct from the Prophet Muhammed (through his daughter, Fatima) whose tribe was Al Quraish and whose clan was Al Hashim.<sup>53</sup> Hussein's ancestry and personal public observance of his Muslim faith provide the Islamists with a rationale for the support of his regime even though it does not exactly fit their ideal.

### **3. Intimidation: Loyalty of the Military**

King Hussein's heritage was also a large factor in the loyalty of his armed forces. When Glubb Pasha arrived in Jordan in 1930, he began fill the ranks of the Arab Legion (the predecessor of the Jordanian Arab Army) with recruits from bedouin tribes. The bedouins placed a high value on the king's ancestry and common nomadic heritage. As a result, the Arab Legion began a tradition of a highly disciplined and fiercely loyal organization. This proved to be instrumental in the Hashemite regime's ability to remain in power, providing it with the necessary force to put down insurgency in a time of crisis. The best example of such a time was in 1970 when a rebellion by Palestinian refugees which came to be known as "Black September" threatened to bring down the monarchy. The Palestinians had organized commando units that conducted raids into Israel. Israel responded in kind, forcing the Jordanian army to fight

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<sup>53</sup>James Lunt, *Hussein of Jordan*, (London: MacMillan London, Ltd., 1989) p.xxi.

alongside the Palestinian instigators. The commandos set up bases in several major towns with the headquarters in Amman. They began to enforce their own rules and security measures on the local population. On September 16 the Palestinians were ordered to disarm but refused. The resulting battle between Jordanian troops and Palestinian commandos essentially amounted to a civil war. Finally, the army destroyed the commando bases and forced the Palestinian insurgents into Lebanon. At the time, about forty percent of the army was composed of Palestinians, however, the loyal tradition of the organization had been so firmly established that there was no hesitation in putting down the rebellion, killing thousands of Palestinians in the process. Members of the Brotherhood fought alongside the Jordanian troops against the PLO forces.<sup>54</sup> At the same time, the Syrian army invaded Jordan in an attempt to aid the Palestinians but was also defeated by the Jordanian army.<sup>55</sup> Black September was not only a big victory for the Jordanian army, but also a demonstration for the Islamists of what they could expect if they ever became a violent opposition to the government. The loyalty and discipline of the army is undoubtedly a intimidating factor and an incentive for the Islamists to remain non-violent.

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<sup>54</sup>Stephen C. Pelletiere, *A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995) p. 25.

<sup>55</sup>Arthur Day, *East Bank/West Bank: Jordan and the Prospects for Peace*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1986) pp. 75-84.

#### 4. Political Participation

In 1988, King Hussein made a decision to renounce all Jordanian claims to the West Bank which paved the way for new elections. Other factors in the decision to hold new elections were the Intifada in the Occupied Territories in 1987 and the widespread discontent in Jordan with Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i and his cabinet in 1988.<sup>56</sup>

In 1989, elections were held for the first time in twenty years in Jordan. Although the elections were not part of the co-optation scheme of the regime, the government has since used them to further reduce the threat from the Islamist camp. The landslide victories of Islamist candidates in the 1989 elections caught the regime off guard, but changes were later implemented in the electoral system that reduced the Islamist's influence in government while still allowing them a significant voice.

The elections were a windfall for the Islamists who won thirty-two seats, twenty by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and twelve by independent Islamist candidates. The success of Islamists in the elections was partially a result of popular support and partially a result of the advantage that the Muslim Brotherhood had of being the only legal party in the country. The Brotherhood was much better organized and prepared for political campaigns than any of its competitors, which paid huge dividends. Although the

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<sup>56</sup>Michael Collins Dunn, "Islamist Parties in Democratizing States: A Look at Jordan and Yemen", *Middle East Policy* vol.II, no. 2 (1993) p. 18.

Islamists were by far the largest single bloc of elected representatives, they did not achieve a majority of the parliament. However, the non-Islamist electees were forced to form a coalition in order to defeat the Islamists on many issues.<sup>57</sup>

During the Persian Gulf War the stock of the Islamists rose when their anti-Western stance gained widespread popular appeal among Jordanians and Palestinians alike. The presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the land of the Islamic holy places of Mecca and Medina, outraged many Jordanians. The Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, was perceived as a tough Muslim standing up to the American bully. King Hussein was caught between the Scylla of his Western ties and external pressure to support the coalition against Saddam and the Charybdis of internal popular pressure to support Iraq against the "great Satan." The resulting support for the Muslim Brotherhood and fellow Islamists gave them even more political power. Their growing power was evidenced in 1990 when the first Islamist Speaker of the House of Representative was elected. Then, in January 1991 King Hussein appointed seven Islamists to the Cabinet. To three of them he gave the Ministries of Education, Religious Affairs, and Social Development. These positions gave the Islamists considerable power and influence over domestic affairs but kept what are considered the more important ministries, namely Defense, State,

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<sup>57</sup>Robinson, p. 2.

Foreign Affairs and Information, in hands of secular loyalists. As it turned out, the appointments only lasted six months; several policies proposed by the Islamist cabinet members such as separate classrooms for each gender and banning alcohol throughout the country were considered too radical, and the Cabinet was dissolved with no Islamists being appointed to its successor.<sup>58</sup>

Another setback during the initial term in office for the newly elected Islamists was the arrest and trial of Layth al-Shubaylat, a popular Islamist representative from Amman's third district. Shubaylat began hearings on corruption in the government under the previous prime minister, Zayd al-Rifa'i. Rampant corruption was exposed by the hearings and Rifa'i came extremely close to being indicted. However, during a recess Shubaylat was arrested and charged with conspiring with Iranians to overthrow the Jordanian government. The charges were most surely fraudulent and the trial a political tactic to get Shubaylat out of the way and teach the rest of the Islamists a lesson about the bounds of political opposition in Jordan. After being tried in military court and found guilty, Shubaylat was sentenced to death. King Hussein pardoned Shubaylat shortly after the sentencing but the point had been made.<sup>59</sup>

Elections were held again in 1993 but there were many differences from the elections four years earlier and the

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<sup>58</sup>Milton-Edwards, p. 106.

<sup>59</sup>Robinson, pp. 10-11.



Islamists did not do quite as well as before. The field of candidates was much larger than it was in 1989 and, since political parties were legalized in 1992, there were nineteen other parties which put up candidates to compete with those of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the official political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>60</sup> Also, in 1993 the Islamists were no longer riding the crest of popularity that had existed during the Gulf War. The biggest difference, however, was the change in election law implemented by King Hussein that reduced support for the Islamists.

The new election law, known as the "one person, one vote" law, reduced the support for the Islamist party candidates and increased support for local and tribal candidates. As described by Abla Amawi:

"The law in effect during the 1989 elections designated a specific number of seats for each of the country's twenty electoral districts, and gave each voter a number of votes equal to the number of seats designated for his/her district. Thus, the voter in Amman's second district cast three ballots for the three designated seats in that district, while a voter in the Irbid governorate voted for nine candidates corresponding to its nine designated seats. By contrast, the change in the electoral law allowed only one vote for each voter, regardless of the number of seats designated for his/her district. Therefore, a voter in Amman's second district would vote only for one candidate under the new law."<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>60</sup>Abla M. Amawi, "The 1993 Elections in Jordan", *Arab Studies Quarterly* vol.16, no.3 (Summer 1994) p.17.

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid*, p.16.

This measure forced voters in many cases to choose between casting their ballot for a candidate from their tribe or for a candidate backed by a party. Realizing that all politics were indeed local and they would lose in many cases, the IAF and sixteen other parties protested the law change. The King was adamant, though, and refused to budge. The result was that the IAF candidates won sixteen seats and independent Islamists won six additional seats for a total of twenty-two, ten shy of the previous total but still a substantial bloc<sup>62</sup>.

The overall effect of democratization through the holding of elections with regards to the co-optation of the Islamists was further assimilation into the bureaucratic process and a greater stake in the Jordanian government. The Islamists proved that they were a powerful political group and gained the largest voice they have ever had in Jordanian politics. However, the King still retained ultimate political power and succeeded in cementing the Brotherhood's role as loyal opposition.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

The Jordanian regime's co-optation of the Muslim Brotherhood has been successful due to several factors but mainly because it has been beneficial to both sides. King Hussein has used policies designed to co-opt the Islamists in order to strengthen his own political power and the

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<sup>62</sup>Robinson, pp.3-4.

Islamists have been willing to be co-opted for the same reason.

The unspoken *quid pro quo* that has existed between the monarchy and the Islamists for over 40 years has provided each side with a certain amount of legitimacy. The recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood by the regime gave that organization the freedom to engage in activities which benefitted itself as well as the community. In return, the position taken by the Brotherhood as loyal opposition and supporter of the regime in crisis gave the sometimes shaky government a more solid foundation upon which to rule. Also, the other alternative, violent opposition, has not been a viable or attractive option for the Islamists considering the Jordanian army's loyalty to King Hussein and discipline, both demonstrated in several instances, particularly in the quashing of the Palestinian uprising in 1970. Violent opposition, therefore, would invite repression from the army, a mission they have proved themselves capable of, and a prospect that the Islamists do not want to consider.

The legalization of the Brotherhood allowed the Islamists to act openly without fear of repression but also allowed the regime to keep a close eye on what could be a potential threat. The legal status of the Brotherhood and resulting advantage over other opposition groups that were outlawed for many years has made it the organization of choice of most Jordanian Islamists. The result is that the

Muslim Brotherhood has enjoyed a large membership and the government has channeled potential extremists into a moderate organization.

Finally, the co-optation of the Islamists has allowed the government and the Islamists to counterbalance mutual enemies in the form of secular opposition such as Nasserists, Communists and Ba'thists. In this respect, a strong Muslim Brotherhood which supported the regime was good for both the government and the Islamists.

King Hussein has proven himself to be a very shrewd and resilient leader during his reign. His policies of co-optation of the Islamists have been some of his most astute. By enfranchizing the Islamists, giving them a voice in government and, thereby, giving them a stake in the political process, he has ensured their loyalty to the regime. The elections in 1989 and 1993 have proven that the Islamists are willing to participate in a democratic government even when they do not always get their way. It is obvious that King Hussein still holds political control in Jordan, but the Islamists will overlook actions taken to cement his control as long as they are still allowed to have some input into the way things are run.

#### IV. ALGERIA: GOVERNMENTAL VACILLATION

##### A. APPLICATION TO THE EGYPTIAN CASE

When compared to Islamist movements in other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the Algerian Islamist movement is a relatively recent phenomenon. Although the largest Algerian Islamist party, Islamic Salvation Front (known by its French acronym, FIS), was first formed in 1989 as a result of the government's policy of political liberalization, it quickly gained massive popular support and won a landslide political victory just one year later in the 1990 local elections. The move towards democratization was made by the government to placate popular dissent with the country's economic situation, divide the opposition and regain the legitimacy that it had lost since independence from France in 1963. However, the meteoric rise of the movement caught the government and especially the army, off guard. As a result, the government vacillated between repression and conciliation in its policies toward the new opposition which only served to increase the strength of the Islamists and decrease the legitimacy of the regime. Finally, when the Islamists became so strong that they threatened to take over the government through democratic elections, the army moved in to restore authoritarianism. However, the Islamists were not willing to stand idly by and let the army snatch political victory from their grasp, so they took up arms against what they considered to be an

illegitimate government. As a result, since 1992, Algeria has been fighting a civil war: on one side is the military backed regime and on the other is the democratically elected but subsequently outlawed Islamic Salvation Front.

The Algerian situation is particularly applicable to the Egyptian case because it provides a picture of what Egypt's future may hold. If Egypt does not adopt a policy of absolute repression as in Syria, nor one of co-optation as in Jordan, but instead vacillates between repressive policies and conciliation, then it may find itself in a civil war a la Algeria. The vacillation on the part of the Algerian government is the cause for its civil strife and Egypt could fall into the same trap if it cannot decide on a single policy to deal with its own Islamist opposition. The situations in Algeria and Egypt are very similar: deteriorating economy, widespread unemployment (and underemployment), disaffected youth, and a military backed regime. Also, both countries have a significant Islamist opposition that has been denied a legitimate political voice.

## **B. RISE OF THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN ALGERIA**

Although Algeria is a Muslim country, Islamic extremism has not been a major movement until recently. The authoritarian regimes established by Houari Boumediene and his successor, Chadli Bendjedid, were successful in repressing political opposition until 1988 when socio-

economic conditions in the country forced Bendjedid to change the Constitution and make Algerian politics a multiparty system. The combination of widespread dissatisfaction and political liberalization led to the rise of Algerian Islamism.

### **1. From the Revolution to 1978**

During the War for Independence, Islam acted as a unifying force for Algerians in their battle against the French. Algerians demonstrated their opposition to French rule and solidarity with one another by observing Islamic tenets: women wore traditional Islamic garb and mosques were filled with worshippers. However, the revolution was not a fight to establish an Islamic state and, therefore, fell short of an Islamist movement. Instead, Islam was used as a nationalistic tool by the National Liberation Front (FLN) in the fight for independence. It served as a source of cultural identity and differentiation from the French. In fact, the slogan used by the Algerians was, "Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my homeland!"<sup>63</sup> The underlying secular nature of the revolution became apparent after Algeria achieved independence and Houari Boumediene took power in 1965 and established a socialist, authoritarian regime.

There was little Islamist activity or protest during Boumediene's regime for several reasons: socialist policies

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<sup>63</sup>Azzedine Layachi and Abdel-Kader Haireche, "National Development and Political Protest: Islamists in the Maghreb Countries", *Arab Studies Quarterly* vol. 14, nos. 2&3 (Spring/Summer 1992) p. 72.

spread the wealth among the population, government was centralized under authoritarian rule, the FLN was the only legal party and its leadership was monopolized by those with revolutionary credentials or technocratic experience, political dissent was not tolerated, and the economy was very strong. In addition, the government made an effort to co-opt Islam by making it the state religion in 1976.

The tight grip on political control and lack of toleration for political dissent by Boumediene did not cause much protest among the Islamists, partially due to the fact that political protest was repressed, but mainly due to the fact that the Algerian economy was very strong. Algerians were economically prosperous during the Boumediene regime due to its socialist nature and the abundance of oil and natural gas revenues. Between 1967 and 1978 the Algerian economy boomed: the number of jobs increased from 1,750,000 to 2,830,000, the economy grew by an average of 8.6 percent a year, and per capita income increased from \$375 to \$830. Since Algerians had ample educational and work opportunities as well as free medical care and food subsidies, they had very little to protest about.<sup>64</sup> In effect, Algeria was a rentier state where the people had little political voice but were taken care of by a beneficent authoritarian regime with income from the sale of natural resources. What little protest there was from the Islamists concentrated on social issues such as alcohol distribution, coed education and

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<sup>64</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 73-4.



women's fashions. As a result, Boumediene co-opted the secular and leftist groups to help promote his plans for modernization. By emphasizing the Western orientation of his policies to these groups, he garnered their support and used it to counterbalance the non-progressive groups, namely the Islamists.<sup>65</sup>

Not all of Boumediene's economic policies were successful, although the bad effects were not readily noticeable to the majority of the population. While he pushed the development of Algeria's industrial sector, he ignored other aspects of the economy, particularly the agricultural sector. As a result, the revenues from oil and natural gas exports paid for investment in industry but Algeria became dependent on food imports and was faced with a growing national debt.

## **2. 1979 to 1988**

President Boumediene died in December 1978 and in early 1979 he was succeeded by Chadli Bendjedid, a military commander from the Oran District. Bendjedid had been a loyal supporter of Boumediene and was expected to continue the former president's economic policies. Instead, he instituted a number of economic reforms with the intention of liberalizing the economy. Bendjedid believed that a diversified economy that was not dependent on oil and gas revenues was necessary for economic stability and modernization. The large industrial public sector was

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<sup>65</sup>*Ibid*, p. 74.

reorganized by breaking up the state-owned enterprises and giving the private sector a greater role in agriculture and industry. For example, SONATRACH, Algeria's largest state-owned company, was divided up into 13 smaller companies and investment in industry dropped from 59 percent of total investment to 38.6 percent while investment in agriculture grew from 4.7 percent to 11.7 percent.<sup>66</sup>

Unfortunately, the reforms only served to create an economic quagmire. When public industries were privatized and bureaucracies were reorganized in an effort to improve efficiency, profit and production became much more important than they had been before. Many managers who were inexperienced with competitive markets chose simply to increase the prices of their products, sometimes as much as 50 to 200 percent overnight, making inflation grow at an annual rate of 42 percent. Unemployment skyrocketed to 22 percent. Young workers were the hardest hit and 70 percent found themselves without jobs. To make matters worse, world oil prices fell in the mid-1980s and in 1985-86 Algerian oil revenues dropped 21 percent. By the end of 1988, eight out of every ten reformed state corporations were in debt.<sup>67</sup> The sinking economy also made it impossible for the government to continue its welfare policies which intensified the negative effects of the economic reforms among the lower classes. Those who still had jobs lost

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<sup>66</sup>John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) pp. 233-4.

<sup>67</sup>Layachi and Haireche, p. 75.

their social benefits, the black market was rampant, and food and housing shortages became a problem.

Political opposition by Islamist groups began to surface during the economic hardships of the 1980s. In 1982, a major strike and demonstration by students at the University of Algiers calling for a ban of alcohol were held before being put down by the police. Also in 1982, a group of anti-government Islamists known as the Algerian Islamist Movement, was formed. Other than its existence and the fact that many of its members were arrested after a cache of arms and explosives was found in a police raid in December 1982, the group did not do much that was noteworthy. The leader, Mustafa Bouyali, was killed in a police ambush in 1987.

By 1988, the people had become entirely disillusioned with the reforms and the government itself. As long as the Algerian economy had been booming, the people were willing to live without much political voice. However, after the economy began to disintegrate due to Bendjedid's reforms and the poor oil market, the people would no longer remain quiet. Basically, Algeria had ceased to function as a rentier state. Protests by students began as early as 1986 and labor joined them in 1987. However, by 1988 the economy was at its worst and in September an epidemic of strikes hit the country. In early October, rumors of a major strike were circulating throughout Algiers, but the strike did not materialize. On 5 October rioting began in the streets of Algiers as thousands of young men attacked and destroyed

symbols of authority, wealth and consumption. The rioting spread to other cities the next day. On 6 October the government declared a state of emergency and called in the army to restore order. The army was brutal in its suppression of the riots; between 250 and 500 people were killed and thousands more were taken into custody, many of which were tortured. Although the army had gained control of the streets by 10 October, the massive opposition embodied by the riots had grown.<sup>68</sup>

### **3. Outcome of the 1988 Riots: Rise of FIS**

As a result of the riots, Bendjedid made some significant concessions. On 3 November, less than a month after the start of the riots, Bendjedid called for a national referendum to revise the 1976 Constitution. The action was not entirely altruistic; Bendjedid saw that his own legitimacy was shaky and saw this as a way to solidify his position while, at the same time, dividing the opposition and weakening the military. He personally oversaw the revision to ensure that it was a reform from above and he controlled the nature of its contents. The new Constitution was approved by referendum in February 1989 with 73.43 percent voter approval.<sup>69</sup> The new document made no mention of the leading role of the FLN and made the Algerian politics a multiparty system. In addition, it

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<sup>68</sup>Ruedy, p. 249.

<sup>69</sup>Yahia H. Zoubir, "The Painful Transition from Authoritarianism in Algeria", *Arab Studies Quarterly* vol. 15, no. 3 (Summer 1993) p. 90.

reduced the function of the military to strictly national defense, taking away its political and economic functions.

The new Constitution guaranteed the basic freedoms of expression, association and assembly, but, most importantly, it gave citizens the right to form political parties.

The intended result of these revisions was a pluralistic political field which pitted different opposition groups against each other, taking some of the heat off the government. However, what President Bendjedid did not foresee was the rise in popularity of the Islamist movement. FIS was formed in February 1989 and in September filed an application for recognition as a political party. The platform of the new party was the implementation of the shariah as the legal code. Although the law regarding political associations contained verbiage that prevented the "foundation of parties whose creation or action rests exclusively on a religious, linguistic or regionalist basis" Bendjedid wasted no time in approving the request.<sup>70</sup> FIS immediately won a large following. It presented itself as the "son" of FLN (a pun using the pronunciation of the French acronym FIS which sounds like the French word for son, "fils") and its successor as the leader in the fight for national pride. Most of its supporters were part of the underprivileged element in Algerian society, particularly the unemployed.

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<sup>70</sup>Law 89-11, Article 5 cited in Zoubir, p. 90.

The leaders of the new Islamist party were Dr. Abasi Madani and Ali Belhadj, two well-known Islamist activists. Madani, born in 1931, had been one of the founding members of the FLN and was imprisoned during most of the revolution. He received a Ph.D. in Educational Sciences at the University of London in 1978, was imprisoned from 1982 to 1984 for participation in the strikes and demonstrations at the University of Algiers in November 1982, and had been a teacher at the Institute of Educational Sciences at Bouzareah since 1984. Western educated and married to an Englishwoman, Madani represents and appeals to, the less violent and extreme Islamist elements in Algeria. Belhadj was born in 1956 and was orphaned when his parents were killed in the War for Independence. He received a religious education and began preaching after graduation. Between 1982 and 1987 he was imprisoned for subversive activities, namely being associated with an anti-government Islamic group, the Algerian Islamist Movement, led by Mustafa Bouyali. Belhadj is the more militant and fundamentally dogmatic of the two leaders. Madani was chosen to be president of the new party and Belhadj was picked to be vice president. Although they do not see eye-to-eye, their different views complement each other by accommodating the widest range of Islamist support possible for their party.

### C. FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Regardless of Bendjedid's motives for liberalizing Algeria's political system, events proved that he was willing to support the democratic process even if it meant giving up power. The army, however, proved that they were unwilling to allow the Islamists to control the government, even if it was the will of the people.

#### 1. 1990 Local Elections

President Bendjedid promised elections would be held in 1990. FIS called for elections for the National Assembly but Bendjedid started at the local level. The first free elections in Algeria since independence took place on 12 June 1990 to choose local and provincial leaders. The results were a shock to everyone: with a voter turnout of 65 percent, FIS won control of 853 of the 1551 municipal councils and 32 of the 48 *wilayas*, or departments. It received the majority of votes in all of Algeria's large cities: 64 percent in Algiers, 70 percent in Oran and 72 percent in Constantine and gained control of every municipal council in four *wilayas*.<sup>71</sup> The results were a huge disappointment to Bendjedid, the FLN, and the army, all of which despised the Islamists. However, a smooth transition to FIS control was effected at the local level, which was an encouraging sign that democratization was going to work.

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<sup>71</sup>Francois Burgat and William McDowell, *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*, (Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1993) pp. 279-80.

Algerians received a dose of reality soon after the FIS electees took office. Regardless of their popularity and intentions, the candidates proved that they were inexperienced and support for FIS ebbed as many of the new officials governed with less effectiveness than those they had replaced. It began to look as if Bendjedid had taken a gamble, in that by allowing the Islamists to fill some government offices, he was giving them enough rope to hang themselves.

By early 1991, FIS popularity was at a low point. Not only had it become apparent that the FIS candidates elected to office in the local elections were poor managers, but FIS had given strong public support to Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. The quick and decisive rout of Iraqi forces by the international coalition led by American troops made FIS look somewhat foolish in the eyes of Algerians and cost it much popular support.<sup>72</sup> Despite this fact, FIS continued to call for parliamentary elections. Bendjedid accommodated them and scheduled elections for the National Assembly to be held in June 1991.

## **2. Electoral Reform**

The Algerian Prime Minister, Mouloud Hamrouche, and President Bendjedid set out to exploit the weakness of FIS due to their perceived waning popularity. So, in the spring

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<sup>72</sup>Hugh Roberts, "A Trial of Strength: Algerian Islamism", *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis*, James Piscatori, ed. (The Fundamentalism Project: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991) pp. 144-8.



of 1991, an electoral law was passed by the National Assembly that was detrimental to FIS. The new law increased the number of seats in the National Assembly and changed the distribution so that rural areas, where support for the FLN was greatest, were more heavily represented. Also, a law was passed that forbade the use of mosques and schools for political purposes and restricted voting by proxy.<sup>73</sup>

Although FIS had been weakened by the mismanagement of the wilayas and the support of Iraq during the Gulf War, it would not allow the new law to be passed without a fight. FIS leaders protested the electoral reform law and called for a general strike on 23 May 1991, just weeks before the elections were supposed to take place. Unfortunately for the Islamists, the strike was largely ineffectual because the bulk of FIS supporters were unemployed. FIS then called for demonstrations and occupation of the main squares in Algiers, a much more effective tactic. In response, Bendjedid canceled the elections and announced a state of emergency. The army was again called in to restore order. Again, the army was brutal in its efforts; the Algerian League of Human Rights tallied 300 dead and 8000 arrested in clashes between Islamists and the army, but the government acknowledged only 55 deaths (5 of which were claimed to be soldiers).<sup>74</sup> For their part, the leaders of FIS told their

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<sup>73</sup>Under the previous voting law, men could vote by proxy in place of their wives and other members of their family, a practice that was used mostly by traditional Muslims and less by secular, Westernized Algerians.

<sup>74</sup>Layachi and Haireche, p. 79.

followers to refrain from violence so the army would not have a reason to use excessive force. However, the army provoked FIS members to violence when they began to remove Islamic slogans from town halls under FIS control and replace them with "By the People, For the People" which was the FLN's motto. These provocation's began on 25 June and, after FIS members began to fight with the army, Madani and Belhadj were arrested on 30 June. The charges brought against them included "armed conspiracy against the state."<sup>75</sup>

Despite the violence and repression, the government acquiesced to Islamist demands and agreed to revise the electoral law. The Prime Minister Hamrouche was replaced by Sid Ahmed Ghazali and Bendjedid agreed to reschedule the elections before the end of the year. However, the revised electoral law still contained elements of the original only in a diluted form: it increased the seats in the National Assembly from 295 to 430 (instead of the 542 created in the earlier law) with most of the new seats representing rural areas where the FLN was strongly supported. Since the FIS leadership and many of its followers were in jail, the party was unable to generate much resistance. President Bendjedid rescheduled the parliamentary elections for 26 December 1991 and 16 January 1992 in accordance with the two ballot system.

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<sup>75</sup>Roberts, pp. 148-9.

### 3. 1991 National Assembly Elections

As the elections approached, FIS did not announce its decision to enter candidates until just twelve days prior to election day. Despite the fact that its leaders were in prison and it did not have much campaign time, FIS had another astounding victory at the polls. The legislative elections in December 1991 proved that the local elections the year before were not a fluke and that FIS retained its popularity. FIS won 188 out of 430 seats in the first ballot. The results were not quite as one-sided as those in the previous local elections but FIS needed to win just 28 seats in the second ballot on 16 January to gain a majority and form a government.

After the first round of elections, Bendjedid demonstrated his commitment to democratization by beginning negotiations with FIS. The army and secular parties, already worried by the strong showing of FIS at the polls, became very concerned about the turn of events. Bendjedid proposed a "cohabitation period" during which he would remain in the presidency and the Islamists would control non-strategic ministries such as education, justice and religious affairs. The other ministries would be controlled by members of the FLN. Alarmed at the prospect of an Islamist government, the army moved in, forced President Bendjedid to resign and established a High Security Council on 4 January 1992, just 12 days before the second round of elections were scheduled to be held. Abdelmalek Benhabiles

was chosen to head the Council until a new president was elected, within 45 days per the Constitution. However, Benhabiles resigned just days after being appointed and the army then formed a High State Council (HSC) consisting of civilian and military officials. The HSC announced that elections would be rescheduled when the "necessary conditions are achieved for the normal functioning of institutions of the state." A resulting rise in violence caused the HSC to announce a state of emergency for one year on 9 February and subsequently outlaw FIS on 4 March.<sup>76</sup> In addition, Madani and Belhadj, imprisoned since the previous July, were tried in February and given sentences of 12 years each.

#### **D. DESCENT INTO CIVIL WAR**

With its leaders imprisoned and its political wing banned, FIS began an armed struggle against the state to reclaim what it considered to be its legitimate place in the Algerian government. The Islamists resorted to guerrilla tactics including bombings, assassinations and pitched gun battles in the streets.<sup>77</sup> The government responded by hunting down suspected extremists and fighting back in the streets. The resulting civil war that has raged since 1992 has claimed an estimated 40,000 lives, many of them innocent civilians.

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<sup>76</sup>Layachi and Haireche, pp. 80-1.

<sup>77</sup>Roddy Scott, "A War Without Mercy", *The Middle East*, December 1995, p. 12.

## 1. FIS

The government's repression of FIS had several consequences, most detrimental to one side or the other. The head of the organization was effectively cut off when Madani and Belhadj were imprisoned and the internal organization of the group was weakened by its illegal status, however, the movement did not die. Instead, the government's policies only increased the resolve of the FIS supporters and helped the movement gain popular support. The army was perceived by many as having taken illegal actions when they dissolved the government because the elections did not go their way. The result was that many chose to support FIS, not because they favored an Islamic-based government, but because, in winning the first round of elections, they gained legitimacy while the army, in taking over the government, had lost legitimacy.

The Islamist organization was put into disarray by the government's repression but elements of the movement quickly reorganized to form the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The GIA began fighting a guerrilla war against the army but soon resorted to terrorism and attacks on innocent bystanders. The lack of competent leadership became apparent as intellectuals, journalists, foreigners, and even popular singers were all made targets for assassination by the GIA. Women who did not wear the traditional veil in public were murdered and raped.

Fearing a loss of support and marginalization due to the GIA's actions, FIS reorganized and, in the summer of 1994, formed its official fighting arm, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). The AIS has fought a more conventional war against the Algerian army and is officially under the control of FIS, however, in the anarchic environment of civil war there have been incidents where the GIA and AIS have fought alongside each other and the distinction between the two has been blurred. Certainly, the AIS has engaged in some atrocities, but not to the extent of the GIA.<sup>78</sup> For its part, the army has used napalm and summary executions in its fight against the Islamists.

## **2. The Algerian Government**

The government remains controlled by the military. However, there is an internal ideological division between hard-liners, known as eradicators, and those in favor of dialogue with FIS, known as reconciliators. The reconciliators seemed to have the upper hand when General Lamine Zeroual was installed as President in February 1994 and made a move towards dialogue with FIS by moving Madani and Belhadj from prison to house arrest in September 1994. However, the negotiations between the government and the Islamists fell through and Zeroual announced on 31 October that dialogue had failed and the army was given full authority to wipe out the Islamist armed opposition. Soon

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<sup>78</sup>Arun Kapil, "Algeria's Crisis Intensifies: The Search for a 'Civil Pact'", *Middle East Report* January-February 1995, p. 5.

after the leader of the eradicators, General Mohammed Lamari, was promoted to General of the Army Corps, a new position created just for him.

Part of the reason for the government's tough stance is the increased support it began to receive from France. Afraid of the massive immigration that a protracted civil war was producing, France increased its supply of high-tech arms to the Algerian army in hopes that it would quickly end the war.

On 17 November 1995, the government made a move to consolidate its legitimacy by holding presidential elections, the first elections since 1991. Zeroual won convincingly with over 60 percent of the votes. However, FIS is still outlawed and was not allowed to participate in the elections which caused many Islamists to declare that the government still lacked legitimacy.

### **3. Efforts to End the Civil War**

Efforts have been made to end the civil war on several occasions. Unfortunately, none of them has paid dividends so far. As mentioned above, President Zeroual tried to negotiate with FIS in late 1994 but to no avail. In January 1995, Sant Egidio, a Catholic association with close ties to the Vatican, invited leaders from the disputing sides (including the major secular parties in Algeria) to Rome for a conference. Representatives from both FIS and the FLN attended. The conference produced a National Contract in which all groups agreed to: reject violence as a means of

gaining or retaining power, respect legitimate changeover of power, reject dictatorship, enforce the army's non-intervention in political affairs, and respect and promote human rights.<sup>79</sup> Unfortunately, the agreement did not go much further. The reaction by President Zeroual was a denunciation of the conference and its outcome as uninvited intervention in Algeria's domestic affairs. Finally, as stated above, presidential elections were held in November 1995. Although the FIS was banned from participating, an Islamist candidate, Sheik Mahfoud Nahnah, the leader of the Algerian Islamist group Hamas, came in a distant second behind Zeroual. The fact that an Islamist candidate entered the race and lost added some legitimacy to Zeroual's presidency although most members of FIS do not hold that opinion and it is unlikely that the election will end the civil war.

#### **E. CONCLUSION**

The civil war in Algeria is not as much a product of ideology as it is of legitimacy. The rise of the Islamist movement was brought about by economic hardship and thrived due to the lack of legitimacy of the FLN regime. FIS assumed the leadership of a popular anti-government sentiment and gained support through populist rhetoric. The civil war was the result of the regime's vacillation in its

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<sup>79</sup>William H. Lewis, "Algeria on the Brink", *Strategic Forum* (National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies) no. 32 (June 1995) p. 2-3.



policies towards the Islamists: political liberalization followed by brutal repression. The army proved that it was unwilling to commit to democracy if it meant that an Islamist government would be in power. However, once the door to democratization was opened, it has been difficult to close it again.

The Islamists demonstrated a willingness and ability to work through a democratic process. They ran campaigns, gathered support and were legally elected to office. Their lack of management skills at the local levels of government brings up questions of their ability to govern at the national level, however, they never got the chance to prove themselves.

The Algerian Civil War has not ended and it is difficult to predict how it may end. However, it provides an excellent picture of what may happen in Egypt if they vacillate in their policies towards the Islamists in the same manner as the Algerian government. Although the army has the power to install the government it wants, without support from the people, civil war may be the best that will come out of the situation.



## V. EGYPT: CRADLE OF ISLAMISM

### A. THREAT TO EGYPTIAN STABILITY

In this century, Islamism in the Middle East had its beginnings in Egypt with the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. The rise and spread of the movement within Egypt and to other Middle Eastern states has been a cause for concern by leaders throughout the region as well as in the West. Egypt's longstanding position as leader of the Arab world combined with its close ties to the West make its political stability a concern to the national interests of states in both camps. Therefore, the violent Islamist political opposition that has grown in Egypt has become a threat, not only to Egypt's political stability, but also to the national interests of countries in the Middle East and in the West, including the United States. So far, the Egyptian government's attempts to neutralize the Islamists have failed to do so. Egyptian policies since the takeover by the Free Officers in 1952 have ranged from repression to co-optation with varying results, but, over the last four and a half decades, the Islamist opposition has become increasingly violent. Today, the Egyptian government is in a position where it must find a solution to its Islamist problem or its political system may collapse.

In Egypt, the phenomenon known as Islamism or Islamic extremism can be explained as a reaction by the middle and lower middle classes to poor economic and social conditions.

The frustration and disillusionment resulting from these conditions is a breeding ground for anger with government and many Egyptians have adopted Islamism as an ideology which they believe can provide solutions to societal problems. However, Egyptian Islamism is not a monolithic organization. Not only do the various Islamist groups differ from each other but Egyptian Islamism has evolved through the four and a half decades since the revolution in 1952; Islamists today are different in many ways from those of the 1950s, 60's, 70's and 80's. While the economic and social problems in Egypt are both a result of poor government as well as a cause of the formation of Islamic extremist groups, there are other factors that have played a role in the evolution of Islamism. A major ingredient to the development of these organizations has been the various attempts by the government to control or eliminate the groups. These policies have had a great effect on the evolution and growth of the Islamic political opposition. The specific ideologies of the various Islamist factions in many ways are direct and indirect results of actions and policies taken by the Egyptian governments under Gamel Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat or Hosni Mubarak.

The policies of each of the three presidents since the revolution have been very different but, at the same time, have used similar tactics. The policies can be generally classified into two broad categories: repression and co-optation. All three presidents used these two policies in

different ways, in varying degrees and, ultimately, with different results. None of the three post-1952 rulers have hesitated to use violence and force to repress Islamist dissidents. Cases of imprisonment without trial or trial by military court as well as torture and execution have been reported under each regime. Co-optation has also been a tool used to control Islamists, particularly by Sadat in the early 1970s but also by Nasser and Mubarak to lesser extents. With this policy the government attempted to deflect opposition and control the Islamists by assimilating them into the political structure.

The effects of these policies on the formation and nature of Islamist organizations were varied and manifold. To understand the present political climate in Egypt with regards to Islamists, one must first understand the evolution of Islamic extremism, i.e. the differences among the Islamists over time as well as their differing ideologies. Then it is necessary to look at the governmental responses to such groups by each of the three regimes since the revolution in 1952. The effects of these policies, both intentional and unintentional, have shaped not only the nature of the political discourse but also the nature of the various groups. Sometimes the governmental responses effectively silenced the Islamists or channeled their energies in positive ways. In other cases the policies that were designed to eliminate Islamist groups or, at the very least, control them, actually backfired and

produced a growth of Islamism. In any event, despite the government's experience with Islamic extremists for over 40 years, it has not yet found the answer to political opposition in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. Possibly the answer lies in the analysis of governmental policies and the effects they have had on the Islamist movement.

## **B. CHANGING NATURE OF EGYPTIAN ISLAMISM**

### **1. Similarities Between Islamists Over Time**

Before analyzing how Islamic extremists are different from each other, one must first understand how they are similar. Although Islamism is not a monolithic movement and the beliefs of even a single organization can change over time, there are some elements that are common to all organizations of the Islamist movement. One of these elements is the fundamental reason for formation and involvement. The root of each Islamist group, past and present, is discontent with the economic and social situation within Egypt. This discontent manifests itself in a search for an ideology which offers a solution to social and economic problems.<sup>80</sup> It is not surprising that the ideology that many Egyptians embrace is Islamism. Although

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<sup>80</sup>This interpretation is the most dominant in the literature surveyed. Examples can be found in: Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The Resurgence of Islamic Organisations in Egypt: An Interpretation", *Islam and Power*, Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal, eds., (Washington: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981) p. 115; Cassandra, "The Impending Crisis in Egypt", *Middle East Journal* vol. 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995) pp. 9-13; Stanley Reed, "The Battle for Egypt", *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (September-October 1993), p. 97.

Egypt does contain a significant minority of Coptic Christians, the overwhelming majority of Egyptians are Muslims and it is almost second nature for discontented Muslims to turn to Islam for cures to societal ills.

The other element shared by all Islamist groups, past and present, is the basic ideology that they are certain contains the key to a perfect society. This ideology, at its most basic level, dictates that society should be organized and governed in accordance with the teachings of the Qu'ran and that the shariah should be the law of the land.

## **2. Differences Among Islamists Over Time**

Unfortunately for Islamists, that is usually where the agreement ends. Different interpretations of what exactly such a government would look like or what school of jurisprudence to accept are only the beginning of the differences between the groups. One major difference is the methods which each group chooses to use to achieve their goal. These methods can be divided into two broad categories: working with the government via political and social activism or fighting against any government which does not accept the Islamist ideal, using all means necessary including violence.

The first major Islamist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, is a good example of one that is willing to work with the government and accepted political channels to achieve the type of society they want. It is also a good

example of an organization that has gone through ideological change during the course of its existence. The leader of the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood at the time of the revolution in 1952 was Hassan al-Hudaybi. Hudaybi had succeeded the founder of the Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, as General Guide, as the leader of the Brotherhood is called, in 1951. He had been a judge for 25 years and brought an air of respectability to the organization which was sorely needed after four years of violent opposition to the government. One of his first acts as General Guide was to renounce the violence during the years 1946-49 and the secret group within the Brotherhood that had committed them. After the revolution the Brotherhood enjoyed a short honeymoon with the new regime, however, soon conflict emerged on several issues. Although Hudaybi wanted to work out the differences peacefully through normal political channels, he did not enjoy the same loyalty of his followers as al-Banna. In 1954 an assassination attempt on Nasser was blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood which resulted in Hudaybi's imprisonment along with hundreds of others. Hudaybi's well known antipathy for violence strongly suggests that the assassination attempt was carried out without his knowledge or approval.<sup>81</sup>

Hudaybi's successor as the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood was Umar al-Talmasani. He was also an advocate

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<sup>81</sup>Richard Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) p. 149.



of initiating change through legal political discourse. His main vehicle for bringing about this change was the Brotherhood's newspaper *al-Dawa* which he edited. *al-Dawa* provided political commentary and espoused the views of the Muslim Brethren, however, it still remained well within the bounds of civil opposition. The Brotherhood assumed the role of a "moderate" Islamist movement due to the fact that it called for change through the workings of government not violence as well as the fact that other, more radical organizations such as Gama'at Islamiyya had become very violent by comparison.

A noticeable shift in Islamist rhetoric occurred in the mid-1960s. The ideology began to call for the overthrow of any government, including Arab governments, which did not adhere to the letter of the Qu'ran and adopt the shariah. This shift came initially from the writings of Sayyid Qutb, specifically from his book, *Milestones*. The premise of Qutb's writings was that modern society was in a state of jahilliyya or ignorance that rivaled the society that existed prior to the Prophet's reception of the Message from God. True Islamic society "is now buried under the debris of man-made traditions of several generations and is crushed under the weight of those false laws and customs that are not even remotely related to the Islamic teachings."<sup>82</sup> According to Qutb, the only way to return to Islam and

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<sup>82</sup>Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1993) p. 7.

overcome the present bout of jahilliyya was to form a vanguard which would lead the umma or Islamic community in holy struggle to overthrow the offending government. Qutb was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and wrote *Milestones* while in prison following Nasser's clamp down on that organization. The thinly veiled reference to Nasser's own regime as that of jahilliyya ensured that the book was banned and that Qutb was executed. The damage to the regime had been done, however, and in his writings Qutb survived to inspire future generations of Islamists.

Although the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood condemned Qutb's views after his death in 1966, *Milestones* had a huge impact on other Islamists. The Brotherhood was soon divided into the two camps: those who chose to bring about change through social activism and preaching and those who worked for the violent overthrow of the government. The older, more "moderate" leadership won the debate and the Muslim Brotherhood continued to work within the political system to achieve its goals. As a result, numerous other Islamist groups were formed that were much more militant than the old guard in the Muslim Brotherhood.

One of these groups was formed by a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Shukri Mustafa. Mustafa had served six years in prison for his activities as a member of the Brotherhood where he was highly influenced by Qutb. When he was released he formed the Society of Muslims, more commonly known as Takfir w'al Hijrah or Excommunication and Holy

Flight. Mustafa's ideology grew from the belief that his group was the vanguard of which Qutb wrote. To keep the vanguard pure he removed them from society as best he could until a time when they would have sufficient strength to lead the overthrow of the infidel government and usher in the new wave of Islam. Although the group was generally nonviolent towards the Egyptian population, they did use violence against their own members who decided they wanted out of the organization. Mustafa and other members of this group were executed in 1977 after they took the former minister for Religious Endowments hostage and assassinated him.<sup>83</sup>

Another group which embraced the teachings of Sayyid Qutb was al-Jihad, whose chief ideologue was Abd al-Salam Faraj. Faraj wrote his own tract called *The Hidden Imperative* which expanded on Qutb's *Milestones* but was much more dogmatic and violent. Faraj's group took action on their beliefs and assassinated President Sadat in 1981.

Through the years since the revolution the ideologies of Islamists have not been the only things about them to change. Differences among Islamists have also developed over the years with regard to social profile. The types of people that become rank and file Islamists in present-day Egypt are different from their ideological forefathers during the reigns of Nasser and Sadat. Although there was

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<sup>83</sup>John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)pp. 133-138.

only slight variance in social profile of Islamists for the first three decades after the revolution, the Islamist of today differs from that of 1952 as well as that of every decade in between in matters of social class, education and age. In the 1950s the members of the Muslim Brotherhood were generally educated, middle and lower middle class, and employed as civil servants, teachers, white collar workers, small merchants, businessmen and craftsmen.<sup>84</sup> By the time of the crackdown by Nasser in 1965 the leadership was middle-aged or elderly but new, younger members were recruited from among the same social class. Of the members of Takfir w'al Hijrah that were imprisoned in 1977, the majority were unemployed due to the seclusion that they were forced to accept as a requirement for membership in the group. However, they were also well educated, the majority being university graduates or students at the time of their arrest. The average age was 24 which meant Mustafa was 16 years older than the average.<sup>85</sup> By the time of Sadat's assassination in 1981 the average age of the leadership of al-Jihad was 28 years old while only one member was 50. Most came from lower middle class backgrounds and were well educated.<sup>86</sup> However, recent arrests of Islamists show a dramatic turn in the trend. While the statistics show

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<sup>84</sup>Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, (New York: Routledge, 1991) p. 81.

<sup>85</sup>Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12 (1980) pp. 438-9.

<sup>86</sup>Ayubi, p. 82.

little change in average age among Islamists in the four preceding decades (mid-20s), the average age plunged to 21 by 1990. Additionally, today's Islamists are far less educated than those of the previous four decades. Only twenty percent of those arrested in the 1990's have been university graduates or students and the percentage of Islamists educated in the most difficult disciplines such as engineering and medicine has dropped from 50 to 11 since the 1970s. Also, the Islamists today are coming from the lower classes as opposed to the middle classes in previous years.<sup>87</sup> Therefore, the trend shows that the average Islamist has become younger, poorer and less educated through the years.

### **C. ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL POLICY SINCE 1952**

The role that the government has played in the development and evolution of Islamism in Egypt can be traced out by looking at the policies of the last three presidents. While each president's policies have been different from the other, all have used the same tactics to control or eliminate Islamists, namely repression and co-optation. Repression refers to heavy handed policies that include arrest, long term imprisonment, torture, execution and, more recently, house demolition. Co-optation means any number of tactics intended to assimilate Islamist groups or at least

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<sup>87</sup>Cassandra, p. 20.

to engage in constructive political dialogue in order to preempt their use of violence.

### **1. Nasser's Regime**

The Muslim Brotherhood supported the Free Officers and the revolution in 1952. The general feeling of dissatisfaction in the army with the government was well known and members of the Free Officers were urged by Muslim Brothers to take action to save the country from ruin. In fact, many of the Muslim Brethren including the father of its founder, Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, felt that the Brotherhood had been the inspiration behind the revolution. Richard Mitchell, author of the definitive work on the early Muslim Brotherhood, wrote that al-Banna thought the organization was,

"the 'consciousness' which created the very idea of rebellion against the oppressions of Egypt; the revolution was the 'echo' and the 'offspring' of the Society of the Muslim Brothers. The view was given prominence in books written after the revolution by members of the Society in which the writers saluted 'the blessed movement' and its authors as the fulfillment of their long-awaited goals and the fruit of their long and painful endeavor."<sup>88</sup>

The Free Officers took advantage of the support from the Muslim Brotherhood. The first year of the new regime was marked by cooperation between it and the Brotherhood. The

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<sup>88</sup>Mitchell, pp. 105-6.

government immediately released political prisoners, many of whom were Brothers and abolished the secret police, arresting many that had persecuted members of the Brotherhood. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) even invited three members of the Brotherhood to join the new cabinet. However, the Brotherhood's Guidance Council declined the invitation. Although the Guidance Council's decision was not meant to put itself at odds with the regime, that is exactly what it did. Friction continued to build between the regime and the Brotherhood, while at the same time internal division arose within the regime between President Mohammed Neguib and Prime Minister Nasser. Although Neguib held the office of president, Nasser was really in charge. Demanding power commensurate with his position but not receiving a satisfactory answer from the RCC, Neguib resigned. When his resignation was announced a widespread and spontaneous uprising convinced him to return to office. Crowds formed to demonstrate support for him which included several anti-Nasser Muslim Brethren. As a result, many of the leaders of the Brotherhood were arrested that very night. Later, they were released and agreed to cooperate with the government.

The leader of the Brotherhood, Hassan al-Hudaybi, hated violence and honestly sought peace with the government. His goal was to come to terms with Nasser and the RCC so that real change and good could result from the revolution. However, the regime and Hudaybi found themselves on opposite

sides of many issues and, finally, the government waged a media campaign to discredit Hudaybi and the rest of the Muslim Brethren. The conflict reached a climax when eight shots were fired at Nasser during a speech on 27 October 1954. After hundreds of suspected Muslim Brethren were arrested including the leadership, their trial began before a military tribunal. The trial lasted from November 1954 to February 1955 and, all in all, about 1000 members were tried. The evidence against the Muslim Brothers was flimsy and was used to support all sorts of charges such as immorality, homosexuality, adultery, embezzlement and molestation of women as well as plotting to overthrow the government. The trial was not what would be called 'due process' in the West. As described by Mitchell,

"From the beginning it was clear that the last thing the government intended was to clarify the case and assess individual guilt...The chief 'judge' - Gamal Salim - conducted himself rather as chief prosecutor: he freely interrupted the answers of the witnesses if the answer displeased him; he put words into their mouths and forced - sometimes by threats - the desired answers...Sometimes he engaged in petty insults with the witnesses; in most cases the insults came from the court alone. The court freely set one witness against the other, fabricating the testimony of one to incite another. The audience was allowed, even encouraged, to participate in laughter and ridicule and to jeer at and insult the witnesses."<sup>89</sup>

Torture was used in the prisons to force 'confessions' out of the members as well as turn them against each other.

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<sup>89</sup>*Ibid*, p. 155.



By the end of the trial, about half were acquitted or received suspended sentences, six were executed and the rest were given lengthy prison sentences including life imprisonment for Hudaybi. Included in the numbers of prisoners was Sayyid Qutb who was profoundly influenced by the maltreatment of his comrades and himself at the hands of the government. It was during this time that soldiers "put down a rebellion" within the prison camp by massacring 21 prisoners who had locked themselves in their cells, fearing for their lives.<sup>90</sup>

The Muslim Brotherhood remained alive outside the prison camps in meetings of small groups of sympathizers and by the time that Qutb was released in 1964 the group had been reorganized. Upon his release Qutb's book, *Milestones*, was printed and embraced by Islamists as their manifesto. The government, however, viewed the book as evidence of a conspiracy to overthrow the regime. In July 1965 the government arrested Qutb and other Muslim Brethren including one who 'confessed' to the plot which gave military security reason enough to arrest the rest of the organization. Another military court was convened and, based on confessions exacted through torture, Qutb and several compatriots were found guilty and hanged in August 1966.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>90</sup>Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) p. 28.

<sup>91</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 31-36.

The effects of Nasser's policies, particularly the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, set the stage for the problems of his successors with other, more violent, Islamist groups. The incarceration, torture and harassment of the Muslim Brothers may have effectively silenced the entire movement if Sayyid Qutb had not been among the prisoners. His writings and martyrdom proved to be the inspiration for several other organizations that formed in the 1970s and 1980s including Takfir w'al Hijrah and al-Jihad. *Milestones* marked the transition into the new era of Islamic militantism that sought to bring about change by violent means. The repressive means that Nasser used also effectively tamed the Muslim Brotherhood; they came into the bounds of vocal but lawful opposition and have not strayed out of those bounds since. This also served to fuel the ideology of the more violent Islamist movement: the younger generation viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as having sold out to the government and given up on their cause. The result was the funneling of new, younger discontents into other, more violent and dogmatic groups.

## **2. Sadat's Regime**

When Anwar Sadat came to power after the death of Nasser in 1970 he had the unfortunate job of succeeding the most popular Arab leader in modern times. Sadat did not have the same charisma and did not enjoy the same following as Nasser which became apparent from the vocal opposition of Nasserist and leftist groups. One of President Nasser's

policies which came back to haunt his successor was the granting of free university education to all qualifying Egyptians. Many seized the opportunity and quickly the universities filled beyond capacity as enrollment doubled during the 1960s<sup>92</sup> and more than doubled again in the 1970s. The intention of the education program was to produce native engineers, doctors and other professionals which would help strengthen the economy. This plan backfired, however, as the universities became a breeding ground for political opposition groups.

Sadat's answer to the problem was a policy of co-optation of the Islamists to counter the opposition from the left. This policy marked the rejuvenation of the Islamist movement. The support given to Islamists by "the Believer President" as Sadat insisted on being called, encouraged the growth of these organizations, particularly among students at the universities. The new president allowed Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Sufi orders to function publicly without fear of being suppressed as they had been under Nasser. He built mosques and increased the amount of Islamic programming on television and radio stations. Probably most importantly, he provided funds to Islamist student organizations at the universities.<sup>93</sup>

Sadat's efforts were helped by the residual humiliation felt by Egyptians from their defeat at the hands of the Israelis

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<sup>92</sup>Anthony McDermott, *Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*, (New York: Croom Helm, 1988) p. 206.

<sup>93</sup>Esposito, p. 94.

in the Six Day War in 1967. The policy was a success and the number of Islamists grew until they took over the student unions and effectively took charge of the universities.<sup>94</sup>

It was this time that could arguably be called the Islamists' finest hour. The strength of Sadat's co-optation of the Islamist students was the fact that the universities had become filled with political groups that were a vocal opposition to Sadat's presidency. By supporting the Islamist students' organizations financially and politically, Sadat helped them grow in size and strength until they dominated the campuses. These organizations refrained from public criticism of Sadat's regime and focused most of their efforts on rectifying the problems that had developed in the university system from overcrowding and underfunding. Student to teacher ratios were outrageous and expensive tutoring and texts were necessities for obtaining a degree. The terrible conditions of the university system were attacked by the Islamists with programs designed to benefit the students as well as to promote Islam. Women were segregated from men in classrooms and provided all-female buses so they could avoid many of the indignities that came with close contact with men in crowded environments. Notes and textbooks were provided at little or no charge on a mass scale and group study sessions

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<sup>94</sup>Walid Mahmoud Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations 1967-81*, (London: Kegan Paul International, Ltd., 1994) pp. 59-60.

were organized at local mosques so that students could study together without distractions.<sup>95</sup>

Once the opposition to Sadat from the left had been neutralized, his enthusiasm for the Islamists waned. However, by 1976-77 Islamism had become a large and powerful movement, gaining a life of its own, independent of government support. The cozy relationship between Sadat's government and the Islamists began to erode as the goals of each began to diverge. It became more and more apparent to the Islamists that much of Sadat's Islamic rhetoric and support was politically motivated; he had only been supportive of them to counter his enemies on the left. Islamist support for Sadat began to recede and they became more openly critical of his presidency. The popularity of Islamist organizations was increased by the disillusionment among the population with the implementation of Sadat's economic liberalization policy known as *intifah* which opened the door for widespread corruption in the government and helped the wealthy at the expense of the lower classes. Islamists perceived Sadat's policies as moves towards "Westernization" and away from Islam. Other indications of Sadat's true secular nature were found in speeches made by his wife, Jihan. She promoted women's rights and was a driving force in persuading President Sadat to enact laws that restricted the ability of Muslim men to marry more than one wife. Finally, Sadat's peace negotiations with the

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<sup>95</sup>Kepel, 136-145.

Israelis, while popular among the general Egyptian population, were heavily criticized by Islamists.

As Sadat removed his support for the Islamist groups, it became evident they had become too strong. It was soon apparent that the Islamists had gathered enough support and become sufficiently organized to be independent. The government soon found itself on a collision course with the Islamic opposition. In July 1977, the government's relationship with the Islamists became openly violent when Takfir w'al Hijrah took hostage the former minister for Religious Endowments and assassinated him.

The group headed by Shukri Mustafa was not a particularly violent one. It did use force against any member which left the group, but that can be considered an internal matter. Generally, the group wanted to remove itself from society and form a vanguard that would usher in the new Islamic society when it became strong enough. In the meantime, the goal of the organization was to remain pure and loyal to its beliefs by avoiding contact with the world of jahilliyah. Some of the members of Takfir w'al Hijrah were arrested during a disciplinary visit to a lapsed member. They were detained without trial and the other members of the group demanded their release. When the government did not release the prisoners, the minister was kidnapped and a deadline was set for the release of their comrades in exchange for the minister. The government did not give in to the demand, so the minister was

assassinated.<sup>96</sup> The trial, imprisonment and execution of Mustafa and his followers was the beginning of a policy of repression by Sadat.

When Sadat stopped supporting the Islamists, they turned against him en masse. It was not a difficult turn to make since Sadat made himself a target for Islamist opposition. His wife was an outspoken feminist, his government was corrupt and he was consorting with the enemy through peace negotiations with the Israelis, according to the Islamist view.<sup>97</sup> An electrician named Mohammed Abd al-Salam Faraj became a leader of the Islamist opposition. Faraj's ideology was an extension of Qutb's which he wrote down in his short book, *The Hidden Imperative*. Faraj took the idea of jihad or holy struggle to its extreme, that all jahilliyya governments must fall,

"The first battlefield for jihad is the uprooting of these infidel leaders and replacing them with an Islamic system from which we can build...Now, in Islamic countries, the enemy lives in our midst. The enemy is even in control; in fact, the enemy is those rulers who took over Islamic leadership, thus fighting them is an absolute duty."<sup>98</sup>

In the spring of 1980 confessional conflict broke out between Coptic Christians and Islamists in the town of Minya which required intervention by the central government. In

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<sup>96</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 95-97.

<sup>97</sup>Esposito, p. 95.

<sup>98</sup>Abd al-Salam Faraj, *The Hidden Imperative*, quoted in its entirety in Appendix I of *Revolt Against Modernity: Muslim Zealots and the West* by Michael Youssef (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985) pp. 161, 165.

mid-1981, fighting erupted in a Cairo neighborhood between Muslims and Copts which the government, again, had to stop. As a preemptive move against further strife, over 1500 people, many of which were Islamists and secular opposition, were arrested in September. One of those imprisoned was the leader of the Islamist faction at the Asyut faculty of commerce, Mohammed al-Islambuli. Mohammed's brother, Khalid, was a member of Faraj's group and an army lieutenant. When he heard of his brother's incarceration, he went to Faraj with a plan to kill Sadat. On 6 October 1981, during a ceremony commemorating the 1973 War, Islambuli carried out his plan and assassinated "the Believer President."<sup>99</sup>

It can be argued that Anwar Sadat was a victim of his own policies. His initial co-optation of the Islamists allowed them to arise from the ashes (after Nasser's repressive policies all but eliminated them) and become more powerful than ever before. Although the Islamists had been co-opted by the government, they had not forsaken their ideals. Once it became evident that the government would not cater to them, a mutual divergence of goals occurred and the Islamists became one of Sadat's loudest critics. Unfortunately for Sadat, they had become too powerful for him to control and he resorted to repressive tactics which had the effect of throwing gasoline on a fire.

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<sup>99</sup>Kepel, pp. 210-211.



### 3. Mubarak's Regime

Sadat's vice president, Hosni Mubarak, succeeded him in the presidency and immediately clamped down on the Islamist opposition. Arrests were made and trials were held to punish those responsible for Sadat's death. Faraj, Islambuli and others were executed and many more were imprisoned. As events settled down, however, Mubarak relaxed many of the repressive policies of the prior administration. The opposition press was tolerated and began to expand, freer elections were held which included the candidacy of several members of the Muslim Brotherhood for the first time since 1944 (under the banner of the Wafd Party) and Mubarak included opposition leaders in consultations on decisions. The result of these policies was an initial acceptance of Mubarak by both the secular and the religious opposition.<sup>100</sup>

From that time on, however, Mubarak's presidency went downhill. Nine members of the Muslim Brotherhood were elected to the People's Assembly. They began to put pressure on the government to institute the shariah as Egyptian law but the parliament refused. The issue became one of hot debate and soon divided the nation. Islamists who had been quiescent while President Mubarak was still new in office and had an image of being "moderate" and pragmatic became more active. Students began to hold demonstrations which brought about government reaction by closing the

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<sup>100</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 243-245.

universities. The next step was riots which were forcibly put down by government security forces.<sup>101</sup>

Economic and social conditions in Egypt have continued to worsen since Mubarak came to power and, as a result, the opposition has become more vocal. By the early 1990's militant Islamists had again begun to commit violent acts in the attempt to bring down the government. The response by Mubarak has been a policy of repression that, in many ways, is more harsh than either of his predecessors'. Not only are Islamists being arrested, imprisoned and executed but Mubarak has borrowed a tactic from the Israelis and has started to demolish the houses of Islamists' relatives.<sup>102</sup> He has started to seize control of the mosques. Sermon subjects even in private mosques must be approved by the government in advance. Women and children are taken into custody to persuade Islamists to turn themselves in to the police.<sup>103</sup> Most importantly, the Muslim Brotherhood, which as publicly professed the desire change the government peacefully, through the political process, has been persecuted together with more radical and violent organizations. The Brotherhood had been making a comeback by winning elections in trade unions and putting up candidates for national legislative elections by running them in other parties. However, as recently as November

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<sup>101</sup>Robert Springborg, *Mubarak's Egypt*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) pp. 216-7.

<sup>102</sup>"Turn Back, Mubarak", *The Economist* 4 February 1995, p. 15.

<sup>103</sup>"The Insurgency That Will Not Stop", *The Economist* 15 May 1993, p. 44.

1995, the government has arrested many of the candidates and their supporters, charging them with anti-government activities.<sup>104</sup> By doing so, the government makes no differentiation between moderates and extremists.

The effects of Mubarak's policies towards Islamic extremists are not yet as clear as those of Nasser and Sadat. He has resorted to a strictly repressive policy a la Nasser, but times have changed and Islamism is bigger and stronger than in the 1950s and 1960s. He somewhat resembles the sorcerer's apprentice in *Fantasia*, every time he attacks an Islamist group two more seem to appear in its place. Mubarak's legitimacy is seriously being questioned by Egyptians, both secular and religious, and many believe that he will be deposed when the army decides that he is no longer fit to rule.

#### D. CONCLUSION

The political climate in Egypt today is partially the result of the policies of the government towards the Islamist movement since the revolution in 1952. These organizations chose Islam to be their ideology to improve the conditions of their society. Although the nature of the groups has evolved so that the Islamists of today only faintly resemble their ideological forefathers, the conditions that produced Islamism remain. Certainly, the

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<sup>104</sup>Mona Eltahawy, "Egyptian Government Cracks Down on Fundamentalists", *Reuter News Agency* 27 November 1995.

inability of the regime to deal with certain economic and social conditions are to blame more than its inability to deal with Islamic extremists. In fact, Egyptian governmental response to Islamism may be described as a classic case of treating the symptom instead of the disease. The similarities between the eras in which Islamism had its largest increases in membership give a glimpse of the factors which lead to Egyptian Islamism,

"In Egypt in the 1930's there was the Great Depression and its aftermath, combined with the feeling that earlier national struggle for independence had come to a halt before signing of the 1936 treaty with Great Britain, a treaty that fell short of national expectations. The events of the 1940's - the war, the increasing influx of foreign troops, the soaring migration from rural areas to serve the war efforts of the Allies, the rising inflation, the immediate postwar unemployment - all contributed to widespread social discontent. That was the decade during which the Brotherhood enjoyed its greatest expansion and organizational strength. The middle and lower middle classes were most adversely affected by the socioeconomic and political developments of the 1930's and 1940's. And sure enough, they were most responsive to the call of the Muslim Brotherhood...

During the late 1960s and the 1970s there was a national defeat (1967), followed by an increasing foreign presence (Russians, then Americans), hardening of the social and political arteries of the country (as upward mobility and political participation significantly diminished), soaring inflation and dim future prospects for the youngest and brightest members of the middle and lower middle classes."<sup>105</sup>

This same situation can be seen in Egypt today and is arguably worse than in the previous decades. Unemployment

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<sup>105</sup>Ibrahim, p. 446-7.

is rising, food and clothing prices are going up due to the slashing of subsidies, and per capita income is dropping. The once healthy industry of tourism has been severely hurt by Islamist attacks on foreigners. The government appears to be failing and the people are turning to Islam as the solution.

If the reasons for the embrace of Islamism have remained the same and, therefore, can be treated as a constant, then there must be a different reason, a variable, for its growth since the 1950s. That variable can be found in the effects that the various governmental responses have had on the Islamist movement. The government's role in the creation of Islamism is poor economic and social policies which create discontent. The government's role in the spread of Islamism is the varied and inconsistent policies of repression and co-optation by Egypt's last three presidents.

Although the three presidents have used similar tactics in dealing with Islamists, the results have been very different. If members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s had the same concerns that members of Gama'at Islamiyya do today, why are not the repressive policies of Mubarak as effective as those of Nasser? The answer is found in the differences in time and setting. Mubarak's Islamist problem is much larger and more violent than Nasser's. Islamists during the majority of Nasser's rule did not have a coherent ideology in written form as did

later Islamists in the texts of Sayyid Qutb. Also, today's Islamists are much more willing to use violence to achieve their goals.

The Mubarak regime's use of violence to eliminate the Islamist opposition continues to be poorly planned. By cracking down on the nonviolent Muslim Brotherhood, which has a substantial following and tacit support, the government is preventing the Islamist element in Egyptian society to have no voice in government. This policy can only result in more discontent. Therefore, by continuing the current policy of repression, Mubarak may make himself too unpopular, resulting in a change in government, either through a popular revolution or, more likely, a military coup that will replace Mubarak with another military officer.

## VI. CONCLUSION

Several conclusions can be drawn from the comparisons made between the Islamist situation in Egypt and that in Syria, Jordan and Algeria. Each country provides its own lessons which can be carefully applied to Egypt, but there are also a couple of patterns which indicate possible paradigms with regard to Arab governments and Islamist movements in the Middle East. The Syrian model is one which has the most limited value in a sense of duplication or imitation, but does provide an example of the necessary ingredients for a successful policy of repression. Those ingredients do not really exist in Egypt. Jordan is an example worth emulating, not only because of its relative success at assimilating the Islamists into the political system, but also because of the humanity that the government has demonstrated in its dealings with the opposition relative to Syria, Algeria and Egypt. Algeria is not only an example of the failure of governmental policy in dealing with Islamists, but also demonstrates how important it is to have a successful policy. Larger trends found by analyzing the three countries as a group show that the key to the success or failure of government policies towards Islamist political opposition in Arab countries is the loyalty of the military to the political leader. Also, Islamists are largely driven by poor economic conditions but that factor can be overcome by political liberalization.

The brutal repression and eradication of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood by Hafiz al-Asad is not likely to be duplicated by Egypt for a couple of reasons. First, Egypt is more closely tied to the West, which has a high regard to human rights and would react very negatively to such acts of brutality. Secondly, there is a much larger segment of rural Islamists in Egypt than there was in Syria, making the process of annihilation through concentrated use of force much more difficult.

After Israel, Egypt is the largest recipient of aid from the United States in the Middle East. The U.S. would have a very strong negative reaction if Egypt resorted to the kind of brutality that occurred in Syria in the early 1980s. Political censure, cuts in aid, and economic measures such as a trade embargo are all probable measures that the West would take against Egypt in such a case. Egypt is already in economic turmoil and could not afford to become the pariah of the international community.

The repression that Syrian troops inflicted upon the Islamists was possible, in large part, because Syrian Islamism was an urban based movement. The concentration of Islamists in the Syrian cities made it easy for the military to move in and kill them. In Egypt, however, there is a large segment of the Islamist movement in rural Upper Egypt that would make similar repression nearly impossible. It would be much harder to find the Islamists and practically impossible to concentrate military force against them as was



done in Aleppo and Hama. The military would find itself fighting against guerrillas in southern Egypt, getting caught in a battle of attrition.

What the Syrian model demonstrates very well is the ingredients necessary for a government to implement a policy of overwhelming repression and be successful. The leadership must be authoritarian and must enjoy the total loyalty of the military. The opposition must be accessible, identifiable, and concentrated in order for the military to be able to inflict massive casualties. Finally, the leadership must have the will to take such bloody measures.

The Jordanian model of co-optation is also enlightening. It demonstrates that the Islamists can be assimilated into the political process and that democratization can be successful in Arab states, even though it may be a slow process. The Jordanian Islamists have shown that they are willing to assume a moderate tack as long as they are given the opportunity to voice their opposition. Also, they have proven that they are willing to abide by the popular vote, even when it means they do not get their way. King Hussein has demonstrated that Islamists can be assimilated into the political system and that their opposition can be regulated to political debate. He has also shown that it is possible to retain power while giving the opposition a chance to actually manage parts of the government. The ideology of the Muslim Brethren in Jordan is very similar to that of the Egyptian Brotherhood:

peaceful change through the political process. Therefore, the Jordanian model is very pertinent to the Egyptian case and can provide many valuable lessons for assimilating Egyptian Islamists into their political system.

If Syria and Jordan are examples of successful governmental policies in dealing with Islamist opposition, then Algeria represents the other end of the continuum. It also illustrates what may happen if the Egyptian policy fails. The Algerian case confirms that Islamists are willing to abide by the democratic process to implement their policies. It also confirms that the Islamists have a lot to learn about administration before they can transform rhetoric into real change.

The possibility of Egypt ending up in a similar situation as Algeria is very real. The passions that have erupted to push Algeria into civil war surely lurk just beneath the surface of Egyptian society and the government's present policy may be the spark that sets off the explosion.

Looking at all three cases as a group, a couple of patterns become apparent that indicate possible paradigms for the region. First of all, the outcome of the policies in each case is largely dependent on the military. The successful repression in Syria was due to the loyalty of the army troops while killing fellow Syrians. The successful co-optation of Islamists in Jordan was possible because the army is fiercely loyal to the king and is an intimidating factor to any Islamists that may consider violence. Also,

their loyalty allowed King Hussein to implement his preferential policies towards the Islamists without fear of violent reprisals from other groups. On the other hand, the Algerian army's unwillingness to allow the Islamists to take office was a big step towards civil war. In places where the democratic process is not a fact of life, military power is a deciding factor in the success and failure of governmental policy.

This lesson is particularly applicable to Egypt which is also run by a military regime. As soon as Mubarak loses the confidence of the military, he will cease to be president. A situation in which this may occur is if he becomes overwhelmingly unpopular due to policies of repression towards moderate Islamists in the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak's unpopularity may reach a point that the military loses faith in his ability to lead the country and another military officer waiting in the wings will replace him.

The second pattern evident in the three countries is the economic factor in Islamic discontent. Syrian Muslim Brethren were businessmen who were adversely affected by Asad's economic policies, the majority of FIS members in Algeria are unemployed youth, and Egypt's Islamic extremists are from the lower class and have few prospects of breaking out of their caste. Jordan also has economic problems, but the fact that Islamists are willing to work within the political system and not resort to violence despite those

problems is very encouraging and is another lesson that Egypt needs to recognize.

In order for Egypt to control the Islamist movement, it must channel them into non-violent opposition through political liberalization. The Muslim Brotherhood must be allowed to have its own political party and provide candidates for elections. The poor economic conditions in Egypt cannot be solved quickly and the situation is only exacerbated by denying the Islamists a voice in government. The cases in Jordan and Algeria demonstrate that Islamists are capable of working within a democratic system if given the chance. Although Egypt has chosen a policy of repression there is no chance of duplicating the success of the policy in Syria and a very real chance of ending up with a situation similar to Algeria's. Therefore, the only solution is opening the political system up to include Islamist opposition, as in Jordan, and thereby co-opting them by giving them a stake in the government.

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